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Demilitarization and Arms Control: Antarctica
by Harry H. Almond, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The characteristics of Antarctica have been widely examined in the
literature.' The continent has been the subject of substantial explora-
tion. Claims have been based upon discovery2 and perhaps upon ex-
ploitation. Antarctica is also the subject of a regime that puts the
* Professor of International Law, National Defense University; Adjunct Professor, National
Security Studies Program, Georgetown University; formerly Senior Attorney Advisor, International
Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense; B.S., Yale University; B.Ch.E., Cornell University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; LL.M., Ph.D. with highest distinction, London School of Economics and
Political Science. The author expresses his indebtedness to Mr. Harry Zubkoff of the Department of
Defense for his assistance in research leading to this article. This paper is not to be attributed to the
United States Government or any other party
I See P. QUIGG, A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA 243 (1983); P. JS-
SUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY (1959); F.
AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS (1982); 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RE-
SOURCES (1977) (resource sharing); C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 253 (1982) (outer space, the Moon Treaty, and the common heritage of mankind); M. Mc-
DOUGAL, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963) (outer space); see also Burton, New Stresses on
the Antarctic Treaty: Toward International Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA.
L. REv. 421 (1979); Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in THE NEw
NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 167 (J. Charney ed. 1982). Discussion of the
Moon Treaty will be found in Committee print of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies for the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (prepared at the request of Chairman Howard W. Cannon).
2 The United States position concerning claims to Antarctica has been based upon discovery.
Secretary Charles Evans Hughes, however, is cited in 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 399 (1940), as stating Hughes stated to the Norwegian Minister with respect to Ant-
arctica that the early bases for sovereignty, e.g. discovery, occupation, and settlement, are
inapplicable today, especially in places such as the polar regions where actual settlement is impossi-
ble. See also id. at 450. When Admiral Byrd made territorial claims that the State Department
seemingly confirmed, the above position became more controversial. Id. at 454. Hackworth also
sets forth the claims made by other states based upon expeditions following the first World War.
Claims were made in part through decree or usage. The polar regions of the Arctic were claimed,
largely by Russia, through a "sector principle," running the claim from the subjacent land areas up
the appropriate lines of longitude to the North Pole. Id. at 461. The "sector principle" has been
rejected by the United States as the means for establishing Soviet claims to the Arctic Polar Regions.
See 2 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1268 (1963). The Soviet position and legal
justification appear in Lakhtine, Rights Over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 703 (1930); T.
TARACOUZIO, SOVIETS IN THE ARCTIC 320 (1938). See also Toma, Soviet Attitude Towards the
Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 611 (1956) (Soviet claims in
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territorial claims aside and, for the term of the treaty, makes those claims
inoperative.3 The climate is hostile to human presence and activity, but
is also fragile. The environment and ecology would unquestionably be
irreversibly disturbed by extensive activities among states and their enter-
prisory entities.4 Exploration so far has indicated the possibilities of min-
erals and fossil fuels on the continent and in the surrounding continental
shelves and seabeds. The area is also a major source of sea-generated
protein, primarily in the form of krill; and, if the ice can be transported
in either a solid or liquid form, it would be an enormous source of fresh
water.5
Antarctica). The sector principle is supported in part by the traditional international law principles
for claims to territory through proximity or contiguity.
Islands, even in the Polar regions, have not lent themselves to settlement, so that if the issue of
discovery for making territorial claims remains unsettled, the perfecting of such claims through
settlement even in harsh climates continues. Spitzbergen, notably, has been the locus of substantial
settlement by citizens of the Soviet Union, exceeding in number those of all the other countries,
including the "sovereign" state, Norway. See I G. HACKWORTH, supra, at 465. More recent devel-
opments in the legal status and the claims of states are in 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 1232.
Claims to sovereignty in the Falkland Islands have been asserted under the terms of "functional
sovereignty," by Dr. John Burton (unpublished address at the Foreign Service Institute, Department
of State, Rosslyn, Virginia, June 21, 1984). While these were asserted upon inhabited territory, the
larger notion attached to a functional sovereignty would embrace dominance in activities, possessory
actions-such as exploitation, mining etc.,-and denials of third states with respect to such activities
when two or more are competing. Toma, supra, cites Professor Kalesnik of the Soviet Union who
claimed that the Soviet Union had a prior right to Antarctica, based simply on Russian discoveries
in the Antarctic for 130 years. See also T. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 57-58 (1935); 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 1028.
3 Article IV of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959 expressly sidesteps the claims for sovereignty or
territory, but also declares that activities taking place while the Treaty is in force shall not constitute
a basis for claiming territorial sovereignty. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,
T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The legal effect of this article on states that have not ratified is
controversial, but probably the article extends to those states because conduct contrary would be in
derogation of the law established among a wide number of states under the Treaty. This, in any
event, is a subject not pursued nor analyzed here. 2 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 1232. The
Soviet Union, in its memorandum of May 2, 1958 based its territorial claims on the Russian explor-
ers Bellingshausen and Lazarev and insists that with respect to such claims "it has not recognized
and cannot recognize as legitimate any kind of separate solution for the problem of territorial posses-
sions in [state sovereignty over] the Antarctic." Id. at 1254-55. See Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty
in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1948) (English position); Rich-
ardson, New Zealand's Claims in the Antarctic, 33 N.Z.L.J. 38 (1957) (New Zealand's position).
4 Economic policy is the policy of the most appropriate choices relating to resources and the
exploitation of them. It bears some resemblance to the policy choices and processes that states must
pursue in addressing weaponry, self-defense, and the legitimate use of force through appropriate
military measures. See A. REES, STRIKING A BALANCE: MAKING NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
ix (1984).
5 A general survey with respect to the Antarctic continent and regarding similarities in the
legal controls for regulating activities on that continent and in outer space is in P. JEssuP & H.
TAUBENFELD, supra note 1. The functional claims to Antarctica as a commons area arise in part
because the entire globe is affected by the amount of fresh water locked in the ice, and because the
climate of the globe is affected by the ice mass itself, and its location. Id. at 163. The other fea-
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Partly because of these characteristics, Antarctica has been referred
to as a part of the "global commons"-an area in which states have will-
ingly foregone their competitive claims to exclusivity, to territorial pos-
session, or to sovereignty.6 Such an arena lends itself, according to the
expectations of many, to peaceful purposes and peaceful activities. As a
United States representative has said:
[It is an area] beyond the jurisdiction of any state which [is] available
for the use of all. . . .These commons are: first, the oceans, includ-
ig the bottom of the oceans, that is the seabeds, beyond the limit of
national jurisdiction; second, outer space, above the limits of national
jurisdiction (wherever that may be); and third, Antarctica, although
one must note that some states have still preserved their territorial
claims to parts of Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty regime.7
While such terms as "peaceful purposes," "common heritage of
mankind"8 and "global commons," along with the notions of "demilitari-
zation" cannot be fully defined, they gain their policy content from the
practice of states, practices which in turn strengthen and promote the
policy content. More specific to Antarctica, notwithstanding the acceler-
ated competitive processes among states throughout other areas of the
world, states have attempted to establish Antarctica as an arena that will
be free of armed combat or the hostile use of force during peacetime.
tures-foodstuffs in the fish and animal life, energy, mineral and other resources-are clearly addi-
tional common factors. IM. at 160. The characteristics of the continent lead to the innate necessity
of cooperation. Id. at 173. Following the publication of this book, the Antarctica Treaty embodied
in large measure a framework of cooperation, but, as indicated in the discussion in this paper, this
framework is opposed by those who seek to project and promote possessory claims. The Treaty did
not adopt suggestions made by Jessup and Taubenfeld for establishing some form of international
cooperation with administering international institutions following the practice in Spitzbergen, or
the use of condominiums, or other institutional devices.
6 See P. QuIGG, supra note 1, at 177.
7 Id. Quigg cites an unpublished memorandum in the Department of State, entitled "A Few
Thoughts on the Concept of the 'Common Heritage of Mankind."' His comments indicate that
many mining companies had argued that "common heritage" of mankind, as it appears in the Moon
Treaty, and elsewhere, amounts to attaining the "basic goal" of redistributing the world's wealth.
Such commentators point to the provisions of article 11 of the Moon Treaty. See Agreement Gov-
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18,
1979, U.N. doc. A/AC 105/1, 113/Add. 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Moon Treaty].
8 The term "common heritage of mankind" remains ambiguous in the practice among states.
It has been used in the Moon Treaty, supra note 7, as well as in the Law of the Sea Convention, and
it has been proposed for Antarctica. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3
(1980). According to an official of the United States at the Law of the Sea negotiations "common
heritage of mankind" was defined as "those areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state which are
available for the use of all.. . .These commons are.. .Antarctica, although one must note that
some states have still preserved their territorial claims to parts of Antarctica under the Antarctic
Treaty. . . ." P. QuIGG, supra note 1, at 177. Article 11 of the Moon Treaty modifies this defini-
tion as an area governed by an international regime.
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Demilitarization is a strategy shared among states that are willing
and able to maintain specified areas free of military activities during
peacetime and during wartime.9 During peace they are expected to act
as guarantors that the demilitarization will be maintained, but in the de-
militarization of Antarctica, the guarantee of demilitarization is not
through enforcement measures, but by the implied threats of each of the
parties that if the area is violated, then they will respond in kind.10 De-
militarization depends upon the policy in context-i.e., on the policy
shared in the demilitarization agreement and established through its
provisions.
The effectiveness of demilitarization and of sanctioning or enforce-
ment measures to maintain the demilitarized status depends upon the
relations among the parties. The fundamental principle is that of stabili-
zation: where the activities or policies of the parties are stabilizing with
respect to the area, then the demilitarized status is maintained and
strengthened." The Antarctic Treaty presupposes that through the de-
velopment of a regime of cooperation and peaceful purposes demilitariza-
tion will be stabilized, and while its provisions are not "mandatory," they
offer a framework and guidelines that the parties have adopted to ensure
order and security on the continent.' 2
The general considerations upon which effective arms control and
demilitarization are based will be discussed, followed by the specific
framework for the Antarctica Treaty, and then an appraisal of those pol-
icy factors that might destabilize their order and lead to "militarization."
Consideration will then be given to how demilitarization is applied
through other modalities such as the nuclear free zones, the zones of
9 The spread of militarization outside demilitarized arenas is far more troublesome today than
in the past because of the availability of modem weaponry. This spread would seriously jeopardize
any attempts to demilitarize such areas as Antarctica. See Djilas, The Militarization of the Soviet
Bloc, Wall St. J., May 30, 1984, at 33, col. 4. While militarization in the Eastern European countries
may lead to an erosion of the communist social orders, the impact would be far greater in the Soviet
Union, since the influence the Soviets exert with their armies is not enough to offset the effects of a
weakening local party and the exhaustion of its ideology:
At the same time, we see the same strengthening of the army's role inside the Soviet Union
itself is already discemable. This is particularly evident now that Soviet army chiefs have
begun to come forward publicly in matters ordinarily outside their realm. Still, while the
army's expanded role means a proportionate weakening of the Communists Party's role
within a country (as it has in Poland), in the Soviet Union an expanded military role also is
an expression of imperialist aspirations: The army becomes the principal force for Soviet
expansionism. Precisely because the Soviet Union is a powerful empire, such a shift in
power could have far-reaching consequences.
Id.
10 See generally A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 550
(1974).
11 See infra note 13.
12 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IV.
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peace, neutrality zones, and the arms reduction proposals for central Eu-
rope (the mutual and balanced force reductions). Terms such as "milita-
rization, .... demilitarization," "stabilization or destabilization,"
"aggression," and so on, used in conjunction with assessing demilitariza-
tion are normative-ambiguous, conveying both the notions of norms that
are at least implied, and certain factual situations which are assumed.
An attempt at clarifying these terms is undertaken in this analysis.
II. ARMS CONTROL: GENERAL INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE
STRATEGIES
Shared arms control policies are aimed at a strategy for public order
among states, and effectiveness and enforceability of those policies are
measured by how far the actions and policies of states promote that
shared order. 3 Where the actions of the two major rivals, the United
States and the Soviet Union, are most relevant, the trends so far have
been for them to enter into bilateral arms control agreements (particu-
larly with the major nuclear weapons under the SALT agreements) and
to provide leadership in developing the multilateral agreements.1 4 The
policy content of the arms control agreements remains ambiguous and
fluid because it is dependent upon the rivals (and other states) stabilizing
their relations, and then proceeding affirmatively toward common goals.
Under these conditions, the arms control agreements along with arms
control policies and decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union
are applied as exclusive strategies aimed at gaining exclusive advantage
over the rival.1" They are also inclusive strategies aimed at maintaining
13 The design of an inclusive strategy between the United States and the Soviet Union to assure
stabilization both in the processes and movement toward arms control, and in their relations in
general, has been founded upon how they expect to deal with the use of force. Under the existing
customary international law, the fundamental issue is not whether force is to be used, but whether
the use of force is permissible. President Reagan outlined this issue, in part, in his address to Ire-
land's Parliament. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984, at A14, col. 1. This address shifts the stress from the
declarations among states not to use force, with all of the accompanying problems of verification
compliance, to actions that would symbolize and further the assurance of nonuse of force. It is
noteworthy that such applications of a nonuse of force would be law-projecting, particularly as
states, pursuing such concrete proposals as the President suggests, show that their patterns of con-
duct are those from which we can reliably deduce their intentions or expectations.
14 See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503; The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (rreaty of Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137,
634 U.N.T.S. 281.
15 See S. GoRsHIcov, THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE ix, 1, 279 (1979). Sergei G. Gorshkov,
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, in seeking to develop the navy of his own country, saw that
a justification for reaching out or projecting naval and sea power required him to establish Soviet
extraterritorial interests. Hence, his approach to naval strategy embodied in part a claim that these
interests were entitled to protection or defense. Moreover, the experience of World War II con-
vinced him that naval forces were employable as strategic forces.
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or preserving the limited, but critical, public order that they need to
make arms control measures effective.
Like arms control, demilitarization is a strategy shared among states
for stabilizing their relations regarding a given area. To be effective and
enforceable demilitarization demands, as does arms control, a shared pol-
icy among states and indicia designating either the breakdown or
strengthening of demilitarization. The indicia can be found by careful
analysis of the trends of states toward promotion of the existing order, or
toward promotion of its dissolution, or replacement with a different or-
der that might more effectively promote their own strategies, and strate-
gic advantage.
Arms control, demilitarization, and other strategies intended to
lessen the possibilities of armed hostilities and aggression engage the for-
eign relations among states in unique ways.16 Most states give their high-
est priority to their own security, both internal and external. Ideological
and interest claims tend to enlarge what is to be included in a state's
security ambit. But in pursuing effective arms control strategies, states,
usually rivals, are compelled to refrain from actions that they believe are
essential for security. In the arms control agreements states undertake to
refrain from actions relating to the production and deployment of weap-
ons.17 Accordingly, such states must moderate their exclusive strategies
designed to promote their own security, and enter into a shared operative
strategy designed to promote their mutual security through shared
controls.
16 The weight of claims, in policy terms, is their effect on either the policies of rivals or the
shared policies that they are shaping. Some indication of that weight may be found in the activities,
and the influence associated with the activities of states. For this reason, if, as in outer space, mili-
tary activities become a dominant element of the relations among states in Antarctica, or if military
support activities dominate all other activities on the continent, it must then be presupposed that the
military instrument is being shaped as the dominant strategy for projecting policies. In outer space,
the United States and the Soviet Union have argued that "peaceful purposes" means, for the one
non-aggressive purposes, and for the other purposes in which all military activities are eliminated.
According to P. JEssup & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 268-69, the questions raised are:
How to assure a real separation of peaceful from military uses of atomic energy and now of
outer space is indeed a key problem in a world bristling with antagonisms, rivalries, and
fears. Can it be realistically expected that the novelty and present mystery of space assure
the success of techniques which have failed to give general peace on earth?
They cite Congressman Teller:
National space policy, like national security policy, is determined primarily by the require-
ments of world politics. We do not want to carry on the burden of armament, but we find
that national survival and the successful pursuit of our national objectives depend upon
military strength. In the absence of agreed upon and workable international programs for
control and use of outer space, the United States has little choice but to develop a national
space policy as an integral part of its national security program.
Id. at 268-69.
17 See infra note 19.
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The parties may tend (through application of the agreements) to-
ward reshaping their undertakings and making them serve as abstract
principles. Such principles will enable the states to interpret the agree-
ment to satisfy their own changing security perspectives. They can then
simultaneously retain a hold on the arms control framework in the agree-
ment to use it for diplomatic purposes and ideological strategies.' 8 To
the extent these tendencies prevail, they offset the shared objectives of
arms control that are aimed at a shared, even if limited, public order, and
the security that such an order affords.
The trends among states for adopting exclusive strategies aimed at
strategic advantage are far too developed to expect from them an arms
control agreement that will change their exclusive strategic objectives.
Such strategic objectives are at best only tenuously moderated. To ex-
pect more is to ignore the practice and expectations among states. More-
over, the tendency to "count" the weapons or launching systems 19 and to
18 Ideological strategies embracing the intrusion of ideology as a means for securing the alle-
giance even of NATO governments are discussed in Wettig, The Western Peace Movement in Mos-
cow's Longer View, 12 STRATEGic REv. 44-54 (1984). Wettig argues that the Soviet Union has been
perfecting the ideological instrument, not to gain control of the peace movements as the primary
target, but to reach the more desirable and reliable political ally to be found in such groups as the
West German Social Democractic Party. Id. Herein lies the possibility of exploiting the class
struggle:
The objective of this strategy is the achievement of "victory without war" in the European
arena. There is no real evidence thus far of a Soviet intent to invoke the military threat
toward the solution of specific questions in their favor. Rather, Soviet military power is
seen as a more general weight for conditioning the arena of perceptions and political inter-
actions. The Soviet leaders are confident that the fruits of this strategy will ripen in time-
in the East-West relationship as well as on the socio-political battlegrounds internal to the
West.
Id at 53.
19 The Department of Defense closely focused upon the balancing of force capabilities, and the
belief that the Soviet Union is not affected or persuaded by arms control policy as a means to limit
the arms competition. Part of the difficulty stems from the appearance of new weapons or from
modernization, part is from the perceived thrust toward "superiority," and part because of the mo-
mentum in arms development that apparently cannot be turned around in the Soviet Union. See,
ag., D. RUMSFELD, REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE 3, 8-13, 16-21,
24-28 (1978). Perceived dangers include first-strike, surprise massive attacks, and a sequential, esca-
lated attack. Soviet commentators reach similar conclusions concerning U.S. weaponry, particularly
new weapons. See Naumov, Some Criteria for Assessing Dangers in New Weapons Development, in
THE DANGERS OF NEW WEAPON SYsTEMs 79 (W. Gutteridge & T. Taylor eds. 1983). Problems of
this kind are made into "wicked problems," too complex for ease in decision, by the parallel develop-
ment of a military strategy and doctrine that would utilize nuclear and other mass destruction weap-
ons and, more importantly, would link strategic and military objectives with political objectives,
distinguishing these from the traditional goal of destroying the enemy's armed forces, and rendering
them incapable of continuing the struggle. When the political aim is to subordinate the enemy
entirely, and not merely subject it to military defeat, then military strategy takes on a differing cast.
For example, V.D. Sokolovsky, Marshall of the Soviet Union, introduces the principle of economy of
force to ensure rapid takeover, in part because of the waste and possible deterioration of a nation
through a future protracted conflict, and in part to gain the objectives with a minimum of loss,
19851
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L2
use the counting framework as a "technical" means for balancing secur-
ity becomes simply the process for isolating what is counted, leaving to
each of the parties the absolute freedom to pursue a variety of their mili-
tary strategies and measures, such as those directed to liberation move-
ments and surrogate armies, to the development of the weapons that are
not covered in the agreements, and to establishing, or seeking the frag-
mentation of each other's alliance structures and overseas military facili-
ties. 20 For these reasons, such trends place arms control in the gravest
danger of becoming an isolated policy, i.e., a policy that includes little to
be controlled, and excludes from control all that is not covered. These
isolating perspectives flow over into demilitarization so that the under-
takings to guarantee a demilitarized arena are situational, as is arms con-
trol, and effective only if situations make the sharing of the
Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy: General Concepts, in STRATEGY: A READER 190-91 (G. Holt,
Jr. & W. Milliken eds. 1980).
Klause Knorr after summing up nuclear strategy in the 1960's, declares that new weaponry
seems easier to develop than public order, and "the military structure to support it." K. KNORR, ON
THE USES OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 176 (1966).
20 See R. CLINE, WORLD POWER ASSESSMENT (A CALCULUS OF STRATEGIC DRIFT) (1975)
for strategic assessments in terms of perceived power, identified by population, territory, economic
capability, military capability, strategic purpose and the will to pursue a national strategy applicable
in time of war and peace. Arthur Larson, perceives the importance of law in the settlement of
disputes and assurance of legal compliance. Larson, Arms Control Through World Law, in ARMS
CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 423 (D. Brennan ed. 1961). While law is of
great importance here, the inquiry in the present paper suggests that the policy functions associated
with law extend its importance beyond these factors in the entire policy process. See also H. BULL,
THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE 68 (2d ed. 1965), which considers arms control through dis-
armament and arms control without disarmament. While the objective of arms control agreements
is to diminish the arms race, Bull declares:
Two facts stand persistently in the way of agreement: the inherent uncertainty as to what
constitutes an equal balance between opponents, and the determination inherent in all mili-
tary policy to err on the safe side. The imprecise and constantly changing balance that
exists in the real world, and in the calculations and anxieties of statesmen, must be trans-
lated into the precision and fixity of a treaty.
Id. Y. HARKABI, NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE 1 (1966) indicates that strategy is now a
peacetime policy, and shifts from war fighting perspectives to preventitive deterrence perspectives.
While this is a matter that makes the question of "defense" more ambiguous, a strategy with nuclear
weapons where neither side would want them used against it can be formulated:
Strategy has been transformed into the art of non-war, of the prevention of war. Formerly
defined as the skillful use of violence, it has become the 'skillful non-use of force.' Preven-
tion of war is achieved by the threat of violence, that is, by the threat of retaliation in
response to a provocation. Strategy has changed from the art of employing violence into
the art of threatening violence, which is the art of deterrence. Deterrence is the exploita-
tion of a threat without implementing it. In other words, deterrence is exploiting the very
existence of weapons without activating them.
Id. at 1. While the Catholic Bishops, in their Pastoral Letter of 1983, condemned a balance of power
through deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, they did not declare that the nuclear weapons
were, per se, illegal, or not to be used if need be in retaliation to a first use. J. CASTELLi, THE
BISHOPS AND THE BOMB 185 (1983).
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demilitarization policy desirable.2'
Additionally, because arms control and demilitarization are contin-
uing applications of policy, leading to the development of law, the poten-
tial of both the effectiveness of the existing agreements, and of making
arms control serve ever more effectively the objectives relating to war
deterrence, is entirely "defined" in the policy function of application.
This policy oriented, law-projecting activity can be aided by the way in
which the agreements are drafted, but beyond the drafting efforts, the
rivals must consider the institutions, procedures and process that will
enable them to give continuing and molding effectiveness through appli-
cation.22 It is obvious that such agreements will be meaningless if they
are drafted beyond the policies or expectations of the negotiating states.
Rather, application engages the shared policy activities identified in
"compliance"-a lawmaking process in its own right. Compliance is not
the process of monitoring and verifying the activities of other parties to
the agreement as such, but extends beyond these unilateral efforts, first
into the shared implications of confidence building measures, and more
deeply, into promoting the policies of the agreements.
The fundamental policy orientation of compliance means that the
21 See infra note 22.
22 Global order, it is stressed in this paper, must be shaped through control over the use of
force matched against common interests. This orientation is critical for demilitarization because the
effectiveness of such a form of force control is dependent upon the relations and stability of relations
among the guaranteeing states. In this sense, there are similarities between neutrality, neutraliza-
tion, zones of peace, weapons free zones and the like, and demilitarization. But, while global order
must be shaped into effectiveness and through common interests and shared policies, the establish-
ment of global orders by treaty may amount to attempts to establish by fiat what states have no
expectation of achieving. The English historian, Correlli Barnett, traces the English policy between
the two world wars, leading to primary and almost exclusive reliance on the security afforded by the
League of Nations, as the natural outcome of a nation that believed too strongly in "moral force."
He observes:
Moral force, or righteous indignation, was in fact the only means the British left them-
selves with which to influence the course of world affairs. For their parsonical belief in the
powers of moral reprobation was accompanied by an equally parsonical dislike of 'im-
moral' forms of pressure, such as bribery, threats or force. The British ruling classes delib-
erately rejected from their thinking the fundamental operating factor in international
relations-power. . . . To take note that power existed, and was the prime mover, was
denounced as a cynical and immoral wish to play 'power politics'. . . . Naturally enough,
in the prevailing atmosphere, much weight was also laid on the moral influence of the
League, speaking as the voice of the world's conscience. It appeared therefore that the
success for the new system of international law and order depended on there being no
lawbreakers. 'Covenants without swords are but words,' bleakly wrote Thomas Hobbes in
the seventeenth century. The League of Nations possessed no sword. How could it? The
League, as such, enjoyed no kind of independent existence and authority at all. The widely
made assumption that it did, as when men spoke of 'support for the League' or 'loyalty to
the League,' was founded on mass self-deception.
C. BARNETr, THE COLLAPSE OF BarrisH POWER 24243 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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parties must communicate with each other, even more than they commu-
nicate their intentions through threat and counter-threat. 23 Communica-
tions that meet high standards of reliability and trustworthiness, as well
as timeliness and completeness, are essential if the arms control process is
to extend beyond the simple checks and balancing of identifiable weap-
onry and delivery systems, and into the decision processes themselves.
Speculation of how the Soviet Union perceives the actions or decisions of
the United States and vice versa even by the most gifted commentators
are at best a risky undertaking because the security of the states is in-
volved, as well as the security of the public order for which the major
rivals are fully and jointly responsible.
While some communications may be signaled through actions, ac-
tivities and past practices or analysis of their official statements and dec-
larations, these are not sufficient. Compliance to be effective cannot be
simply the traditional diplomatic intercourse or negotiation process be-
cause the implications of security, an element of national power, appear
across too wide a spectrum of a nation's activities. Moreover, communi-
cations are embraced in a competitive process and we are compelled to
analyze not only the process, but its limitations and potentials against the
claims, counterclaims and tolerances among the rivals and the global
community. Regrettably, the necessity for high standards of communi-
cation has been the critical problem that states have faced in their recent
practice and history, where wars and arms races can be traced to
misinterpretation.
Beyond present compliance, a further problematic consideration is
that, also like arms control, demilitarization can be reversed. Once a
zone is demilitarized it does not lose its strategic character. The Rhine-
land, for example, demilitarized by the Treaty of Versailles,24 lost this
23 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
24 Demilitarization of the Rhineland was established by the Locarno Treaty, Oct. 16, 1925, 54
L.N.T.S. 291. Article I incorporated the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. Articles 42 and 43
established the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland and collectively and severally guaranteed the
demilitarization of the zone by the parties. Id. at 293. Germany justified the militarization of the
Rhineland by arguing self defense, arising from the threat posed by the treaty of alliance between
France and Russia of 1935, and further arguing that it was only reclaiming German territory. See I
B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: A WAY TO WORLD PEACE 73-74, 375 (1983).
Ferencz provides relevant parts of the Official Journal of the League of Nations with the debates on
the reoccupation by Germany, ending with the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations
instructing the Secretary-General of the League to notify the signatories of the Treaty that Germany
had violated the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. Germany's action, according to Maxim Litvi-
nov, speaking for the Soviet Union, was that of "a country convinced of the injustice of its case,
[that] confers upon itself, first the functions of a judge in its own cause, and then those of a sheriff's
officer." Id. at 379. The President of the League of Nations Council saw the matter in terms of the
global order processes and their impairment-the need to cooperate in "creating a true European
solidarity." Id. at 383-84.
Germany's reaction through von Ribbentrop was that Germany must reject the resolution,
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guarantee once the European allies signaled their intention not to oppose
the reentry of German military forces into the area.2" Areas deprived by
agreement of their military strategic value may recover that value if other
strategic elements appear or are deliberately promoted by the guarantee-
ing states.
Therefore, arms control policies aimed at weapons, delivery systems,
or their testing, production, research and deployment are also dependent
upon the contracting states adopting affirmative measures to guarantee
the deterrence equilibrium that is presupposed in arms control agree-
ments.2 6 They are designed around an exchange of promises among the
potential rivals, and they presuppose a shared strategy designed to make
their deterrence balancing efforts operative. That strategy is in effect a
public order whose effectiveness and enforcement is dependent upon im-
plementing measures whenever the balance or balancing process is put in
question or subjected to destabilization.
As an example, the major agreements such as those of the SALT,
addressing the major nuclear weapons in terms of the ambiguous notion
of "strategic weapons," contain a complex but not a comprehensive com-
pliance system. The parties may dispute about compliance, and even
about their verification and monitoring processes, and they have agreed
to take these disputes to a standing consultative commission.27 But these
procedures and this institutional arrangement does not guarantee compli-
ance. The parties can carry out other threats to ensure compliance, but
sanctioning measures are notoriously tenuous. For example, they can
denounce each other's conduct, turn to international public opinion, in-
troduce their controversies into the media, invoke the "supreme interest
clause," and repudiate the agreement, or turn to other diplomatic or even
economic sanctioning measures. But, between states of equal power,
none of these measures has been particularly effective.28
The arms control agreements are dependent and operative through
awareness, a "fear" '2 9 of the intolerable destruction that the major nu-
enter a formal protest, and reclaim her territory, while opposing the French-Soviet treaty of alliance.
Occupation was essential---"the elementary right of a nation in the defense of its frontiers." Id. at
385.
25 See generally I B. FERENCZ, supra note 24, at 73-74.
26 See infra note 34.
27 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Gov-
ernment of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing
Consultative Commission, Dec. 21, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, reprinted in SALT: THE MOS-
COW AGREEMENTS AND BEYOND 318 (M. Wilirich & . Rhinelander eds. 1974).
28 Cf deKiefffer, The Purpose of Sanctions, 15 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1983).
29 "Fear" as the basis of order is decried by a labor leader, George Schilling:
Fear is not the mother of progress and liberty, but oft times of reaction and aggression.
Your agitation inspires fear; it shocks the public mind and conscience and inevitably calls
forth strong and brutal men to meet force with force. By your mistaken methods, you have
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clear weapons would create. Because deterrence is dependent upon the
extra-agreement element of "fear" with regard to the use of nuclear
weapons, all of the arms control agreements that do not have this linkage
are tenuous. For example, controls over chemical and biological agents,
over environmental modification techniques, radiation, and conventional
weapons are imposed upon weapons with potential or actual military
utility. These agreements have left open the military potential that lies in
improved or modernized weaponry, as well as in stockpiles for use, once
the arms control agreements are suspended, terminated or repudiated,
through provision for maintaining stocks for "peaceful purposes." Be-
cause such purposes include the preparation of armed forces and citi-
zenry to respond to or be immunized to attacks with such weapons, the
amounts that may be stockpiled for these purposes are sufficiently sub-
stantial as to pose a military threat should hostilities break out.3"
Arms control policy under the current arms control agreements and
perspectives depends for its effectiveness upon the deterrence equilib-
rium. But, as already mentioned, this leads to an underlying need for a
shared order and policy between the rivals as the guarantee. Short of
that guarantee, they can at best face each other with equivalent amounts
of power and force, checking and balancing as best they can under the
regulatory mechanisms of "arms control" the continuously changing
strategic conditions. When these perspectives are limited to the weapons
themselves, the strategic conditions tend to be addressed in terms of the
numbers (numbers of weapons, warheads, or quantities of destructive
force reposed in the warheads, in the numbers of delivery systems but
taking account of the effectiveness, survivability, vulnerability and the
costs of these systems).3 But these policy perspectives are those referred
to as "technical" or "military," and tend to leave out the "political" per-
spectives in which arms control policy and arms control agreements are
more clearly perceived as strategies and the strategic instruments for
achieving strategic advantage or strategic opportunities to be exploited at
the misfortune of repelling those you should attract, of antagonizing where you should
unite in mutual sympathy and cooperation for common good.
Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1984, Book Review, at 5.
30 See T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 6-7 (1960).
31 The variety of delivery systems leads to the problem of monitoring or keeping track of one's
rival: while this is referred to as the problem of verification, which includes both monitoring data,
particularly the "relevant" data to the agreements, and evaluation of the data, i.e., the violation if
any, and the weight of the violation, the more critical question is that of compliance. Because com-
pliance is in part a lawmaking, law-projecting, and law enforcing and strengthening activity, and
because the rivals sense that compliance extends deeply into constraints upon their freedoms, or, in
the alternative, upon the preservation of their freedoms, compliance becomes the policy oriented
issue that is fundamental to effective arms control policy. A longer paper upon compliance consid-
ered against these perspectives is being prepared.
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the expense of one's rivals.32 Moreover, emphasis is upon deterrence that
is increasingly based upon the reluctance of the rivals to consider the use
only of the major nuclear "strategic" weapons in their military strategy,
coupled with a growing interest in designing and probing military meas-
ures in which the risks or likelihood of hostilities escalating to the major
weapons is reduced to "rational" proportions.33
Moreover, deterrence, in a policy and decision making framework,
with regard to war itself, is simple, until one experiences the conditions
in which it applies and distinguishes these from what can so easily be put
on paper.34 Von Clausewitz, in examining the decisions of the military
32 See Dyson, The Game of the Guerrilla, 15 YALE Lrr. MAG. 71 (1984). According to Dyson,
the Soviet Union has established a strategy of manipulation-a game-in which the rules of the
game are formed by the Soviet Union, acting as "the manipulator," with the United States as
"dupe." The prize of the game is the "victim-state," and the "staging area states" are states located
near the victim state, but satellites of the manipulator. Within the victim state the "revolutionary
front" establishes the casus operandi, replacing the casus belli. Id. While the activities pursued
amount to a civil war within the victim state, the term "war," and hence the legal and policy impli-
cations of a war, are avoided. Id With either the "short game"-a quick takeover, and the estab-
lishment of a new Soviet satellite-or with the "long game," in which the takeover requires
manipulation through propaganda, protracted conflict through support of the revolutionary fronts,
and so on, ultimately leads to the United States withdrawal, pressed by public opinion. Id. at 77.
Dyson argues that the game exclusively benefits the Soviet Union, enables the country to benefit
from its revolutionary zeal and more importantly the revolutionary experience of the 20th Century,
and is legitimatized as a "war of liberation," aimed at the evils of racist, colonial or alien regimes.
Id. at 80. Thus, a new means for aggression is established, through guerrilla warfare, and through
the myth that guerrillas cannot be defeated on their home territory. Id. Dyson argues that we must
recognize aggression for what it is, participate where we must in ending the game, because this is the
only means to end aggression. Id. at 84-85.
33 Deterrence according to the major writers must include a minimal level of rationality-the
shared perspectives that the rivals are going to act "rationally," within a framework where both sides
can appreciate as to each rational perspectives as to the risks, costs, benefits and so on that go into
the calculus of using force, the possibilities of escalation into nuclear warfare, and so on. See T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICr (1960). Schelling considers these elements of a threat
oriented and threat opposing strategy as a strategy shared by the rivals and shaped through the
interdependence of the adversaries' decisions and on their expectations about each other's behavior.
Id. at 83.
34 C. VON CLAUsEwrrz, ON VAR 120 (M. Howard and P. Paret eds. 1976). Von Clausewitz
indicates that in war fighting the goal is to subdue the enemy forces so that they can no longer fight,
id. at 90, and that a demilitarized zone that remains a non-strategic zone can be maintained during
combat as long as the zone is not needed for these objectives. Moreover, the elements in warfare that
contribute to success can be summarized as the "strength of will," and the elements that "make up
the climate of war," are then "danger, exertion, incertainty, and chance." Id. at 104. These
unknowns make the possibility of ascertaining when a zone becomes strategic during wartime or
hostilities very different than that of ascertaining its strategic character during peacetime. During
peacetime the zone may become strategic for assuring strategic advantage, for maintaining the deter-
rence equilibrium, or for strategic denial, but these perceptions are against deterrence itself, unless,
of course, deterrence and defense are treated as inseparable. See generally Y. HARKABI, supra note
12. For the theory that a "game" is played, designed by the Soviet Union, to capitalize on the
deterrence equilibrium, using surrogate armies, see Dyson, supra note 32, at 71. Sun Tzu, the an-
cient Chinese strategist, advised divide and conquer strategies in peacetime and in war, avoiding
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commander in conducting strategies during hostilities, referred to the
unknowns and uncertainties that defied comprehensive theory as "fric-
tion": "[T]he tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be
reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings
about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due
to chance."35
"Strategic deterrence," i.e., deterrence relating to the major nuclear
weapons, but not the major conventional weapons or weapons of mass
destruction, has a number of special properties that make its problems
relatively easy to conceptualize.3 6 In particular, when they are at the
strategic level, "the objectives of both players are clear-cut and have re-
mained constant for many years. A single objective-preventing a strate-
gic strike by the other party-is of overriding importance. '3 7 When
raised to the highest level of abstraction and generality, it has been
claimed that deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that
the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh
its benefits.38 Here, as with the friction, the changing strategic conditions
and strategies among the rivals or other players lead to situations that
generate enormous complexity. But the most significant element about
deterrence is that created by the major nuclear weapons, because this has
made the strategies of the major rivals "peacetime" strategies, embracing
their national power on a continuous, opposing basis, but operating
through threats and counter-threats. Deterrence came into being with
the advent of strategic bombing because it became possible to hurt an
enemy grievously before (or without) destroying his military capability.
With the opening of this possibility, the threat to hurt him could be sepa-
rated, in fact and therefore in theory, from the threat to engage and de-
stroy his forces.39
With the changing strategic conditions, however, the rivals soon
faced three levels of deterrence. The first level is that of checks and bal-
ancing of the strategic nuclear forces and the shared policy in avoiding a
strategic strike (i.e., in the larger sense both a strategic first strike, or any
strategic strike). Limited wars presuppose bargaining, negotiations and
communications among the rivals so that the wars would end with both
intact and able to overcome the differences that the wars presumably ad-
protracted warfare and war of attrition, and calculations of strategic advantage during peacetime.
SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 71 (S. Griffith trans. 1963). The Soviet strategists use the term "corre-
lation of forces" to establish the larger movement toward superiority toward the enemy.
35 C. VON CLAUSEWrrz, supra note 34.
36 See generally A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 48-51 (1974).
37 Id. at 50.
38 Id. at 48.
39 Id. at 21.
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dressed. Such wars lead beyond the more simplified notions of avoiding
strategic first strikes to problems of greater complexity (decisions are not
predictable) and to difficulties in measuring the relevant variables. With
regard to these wars "deterrence. . . cannot be implemented by threat-
ening a specific level of damage; and [they] do not involve a single kind of
military power."'
Selection of the proper military means in each situation is compli-
cated by uncertainty about tactical requirements, as well as the "neces-
sity to subordinate tactics to considerations of escalation control and to
the political objectives of the conflict."41
A second level of deterrence is that which is below the strategic.
This level is different from the strategic level in that it uses means other
than the threat of inflicting overwhelming military costs. This level is
based on influencing the opponent's political calculus as to the risks and
benefits of his potential actions.42 "The operational criteria for selection
among means are dominated not by technical or tactical but by diplomatic
and political factors. "43
A third level of deterrence is that of crisis and crisis-preventive di-
plomacy. 44 When this level is encountered, the rivals introduce their
strategic instruments, diplomatic, economic, ideological as well as mili-
tary in such combinations and in such designs as to effectuate their pur-
poses. These, too, are characterized by numerous and complex
diplomatic and political factors.
There are hard decisions as to which means to choose, military, dip-
lomatic, political, economic, covert, etc.45 "In these situations, the re-
quirements for implementing deterrence are much less a matter of
acquiring, proving possession of, or using raw military capabilities than a
matter of demonstrating concern, motivation, and commitment, and/or
of communicating intentions.
46
Pursuing this theme further, in the third level of deterrence "atten-
tion focuses upon their intentions."'47 Objectives and means become
more complex. Other policies appear "that intersect and overlap a na-
tion's deterrence policies."'4 Calculations are frustrated when the crises
are prolonged; the assessment of the effectiveness of deterrence policies
placed in doubt. The variables may increase to such amounts as to make
40 Id. at 51.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 51-55.
45 Id. at 50-51.
46 Id. at 52-53.
47 Id. at 53.
48 Id. at 54.
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calculations and theory applying calculations uncertain. The problems
raised are "context-dependent," ranging deeply into perceptions and per-
spectives of the players.4 9
The interaction of deterrence goals, foreign policy processes, defense
and security policies, and the complex policy networks that make the
applicable law largely a policy oriented, emerging process is apparent in
the arms control context. The strategy of deterrence demands that the
first threshold (avoiding a strategic strike) is both a "given" with regard
to the relations of states and also a "necessity":
First, the new strategy of deterrence must use a threat of intolerable
destruction, which as a threat must be absolutely effective as seen in
the eyes of the threatener. Deterrence as a strategic policy only has
meaning when people are confident that the retaliatory component of
this policy will never be called on to function.50
Where arms control policies fall short of regulating the use of force,
they permit the spill over into other areas not within the "control" of
strategic deterrence and its equilibria. Consequently it is evident that the
nations today must face the possibility that even the strategic equilibrium
might be at stake because there is the possibility that it might no longer
operate through the promise of intolerable destruction.51 This can only
lead to the necessity of pursuing other alternatives, and in particular
those relating to more effective balancing through foreign policies.52
49 The problems of arms control, regulation of the use of force, and in general those involving
the relations among states defy formulation. They are what two commentators call "wicked" as
opposed to "tame" problems. See R. MASON & I. MrTROFF, CHALLENGING STRATEGIC PLANNING
ASSUMPTIONS: THEORY, CASES, AND TECHNIQUES 3 (1981). Wicked problems are those in which
there is no definitive formulation of the problem itself; where the relationship between problem and
solution is direct, because the solution "defines" the problem; where criteria cannot be advanced to
determine correct or false solutions; where there is no finality in solving the "problem," because only
new consequences must be faced, again as "wicked problems"; where there are no readily opera-
tional means for solving the problems; where explanations proliferate as we consider what ought to
be the outcome and what is; where every problem becomes a "symptom of another problem," and
each solution is a "one shot operation," because experimentation is not possible, and where accord-
ingly each is unique. The approach taken in this paper is that the problem is replaced by a frame-
work of inquiry, so that through controlled efforts at inquiry, the problem, or better, the
perspectives, situations, strategies, participants, claims and outcomes are examined on a continuous
basis, with a major objective being that of clarification.
50 See R. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 367 (1973) (emphasis added). Part V of
Weigley is a valuable introduction to American perspectives on strategy.
51 See infra note 58.
52 See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 261 (1961). Sanctioning goals and measures
interact, and include prevention aimed at preventing the disruption of public order, deterrence con-
cerned more directly with threats to public order, restoration of public order, rehabilitation and
reconstruction, all of which are identified with strengthening public order after disruption. Id at
287.
The same theme pervades the present study in which we speak of a shared strategy in deterrence
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Because arms control policies intersect with foreign, defense, and
security policies, the analytical framework of arms control must absorb
the impacts of each of the other policy areas and assess them together.
Deterrence is an instrument of foreign policy.53 As such, "its uses and
limitations are very much affected by the nature of that foreign policy
and by the sophistication and skill with which policy-makers use all in-
struments of policy, of which deterrence is but one, on behalf of national
goals." 54
Some form of "balancing of power" might be appropriate to provide
for order-oriented checks and balancing to replace those in the weapons
balancing process, or at least to replace the extensive and intensive devo-
tion to arms control balancing as the end-all of stabilizing relations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. Whatever balance of
power means, it will not lead to a durable peace unless it is coupled with
the further development and strengthening of institutions of international
order. The U.S. must find a domestically acceptable image of world or-
der, acceptable also to other nations, which is based on all of the mecha-
nisms of international influence.
The policy orientation of arms control agreements now becomes
clear: it is an orientation that necessarily requires a high level of flexibil-
ity in the agreements so that the players can accommodate their Chang-
ing relations on a continuous basis. While such agreements can establish
the ground rules for restraint, they are dependent upon the perspectives
of rivals engaged in a competitive power process. Because such agree-
ments are the outcome of the various stages in the relations among major
states, it is more likely that those agreements are not the instruments to
affect the perspectives of these states. They are more likely the reflection
of those perspectives at a given stage in their relations, while the practice
of both states shows, increasingly, that they have decided to turn to poli-
cies, measures and capabilities associated with defense. Moreover, that
practice further shows that in their competitive relationships the major
rivals do not intend to forego the use of all of the strategies at their dispo-
sal (including military strategies) either to achieve exclusive strategic
goals or, less frequently, the inclusive goals of global order. As this in-
quiry indicates, the fundamental challenge for the superpowers is to face
the underlying value demands among peoples for human dignity, the cor-
nerstone of a preferred global order.
- also the means to provide some economy in maintaining the balance, to the extent that the parties
share in their strategy and by sharing reduce the costs of maintaining their mutual security. Econ-
omy of force is one of the "principles" of war, condensing for military commanders the experience of
battlefield actions, and involving care in strategic planning and judgment by both political and mili-
tary leaders. See DEP'T OF THE A~my, PUB. FM 100-1, at 15 (Aug. 1981).
53 A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, supra note 36, at 589-90.
54 Id. at 590.
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III. THE ANTARCTIC FRAMEWORK
Conceptually, as long as Antarctica, along with the demilitarized or
potentially demilitarized arenas, remains a nonstrategic arena, it may en-
joy demilitarized status. This perspective is the counterpart of the con-
cept of military utility with regard to weaponry; the arms control
agreements over weapons can be maintained and promoted only as long
as the parties either agree that the weapons lack military utility or, in the
less credible situations, promise and are willing to refrain from invoking
such weapons. With respect to both of these subjects, the controls are
imposed over things or activities under conditions where those controls
remain operative as long as the parties are induced to maintain them. If
the strategic nuclear weapons establish an objective basis for control, em-
anating from mutual awareness of intolerable destruction, then provided
that perspective is shared by the rivals, it will remain the operative ele-
ment of deterrence. Once the operative element to deterrence is foregone
by the parties, they are left with an agreement that can readily be termi-
nated or denounced. They are also left with undertakings that can be
gradually evaded through subterfuge, interpretation, or application
(eventually becoming practice or an accepted course of conduct between
them).
Demilitarization is then more tenuous than that of the arms control
agreements for strategic nuclear weapons, and is more closely associated
with a dependence upon the relations of the parties, i.e., more akin to the
arms control agreements than the SALT agreements. The provisions of
the agreement however establish a framework for order. For analytical
purposes, the provisions are placed in separate categories as follows: (a)
the undertakings to establish demilitarization in Antarctica primarily
through self-imposed restraints upon engaging in military activities, in
testing weapons of any kind, and in refraining from nuclear explosions of
any kind;55 (b) supplemental arms control and demilitarization provi-
sions through a variety of undertakings relating to compliance and pat-
terns of conduct concerning territorial claims, inspections, exchange of
data on a cooperative rather than a reciprocal basis;56 and (c) further
undertakings for inspection (necessarily implying monitoring and over-
seeing) activities relating to activities on the continent, consultative meet-
ings expected to further processes of joint decision and policy, and
dispute settlement processes based upon article 33 of the United Nations
Charter, but coupled with an agreement, at least, to invoke the Interna-
tional Court of Justice."
In some respects these provisions are hortatory, because there are no
55 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. I,V.
56 Id. at art. III.
57 Id. at arts. VII, IX, XI.
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sanctioning processes to compel states to behave along cooperative pat-
terns. This would be tantamount to ordaining their relations along pre-
scribed paths, clearly inconsistent with their expectations and past
practice. States may choose to establish and abide by ordering processes,
but this presupposes that the "rationality" they expect from each other is
the same. It is abundantly clear in their practice that "common inter-
ests," "common goals," "shared policies," "reasonableness" in general or
in behavior, and even the perceptions of "reciprocity," or "reciprocal
treatment" are all at best ambiguous, and shaped only through long and
substantial practice.5 8
A. The Treaty Itself
The relevance of the Antarctic provisions to the strategic perspec-
tives associated with establishing the continent as a strategic arena needs
to be stressed in this inquiry. The arms control provisions in the
Antarctic Treaty include articles I, V, VI, VII, X and XI.5 9 These under-
takings support arms control and stabilization through a variety of
means." Articles I and V are particularly pertinent to establishing the
demilitarized area. Article I of the Antarctic Treaty supports demilitari-
zation in part by affirmative elements such as those relating to the free-
dom of states to engage in scientific and associated studies, and in joint
undertakings to determine the future of enterprise and pollution con-
trol.61 These are not affirmative measures whereby the contracting states
58 Demilitarization and the related measures of arms control are posited upon the assumptions
of rationality: states and their decision makers are assumed to act rationally; that is, to the extent of
exercising judgment with respect to the use of the weapons under control. These assumptions are
subject to conditioning elements: perspectives that engage the potential use of nuclear weapons that
would fall short of intolerable and widespread, long lasting and severe destruction might open the
way to the use of such weapons, and then the escalation to further, tolerated and reciprocal destruc-
tion is increasingly probable. See W. BARR=, IRRATIONAL MAN (A STUDY IN EXISTENTIAL
PHILOSOPHY) (1958). With the decline of religion, and the adoption of new faiths in collectivized or
totalitarian doctrine such as communism, where that faith dies, there is the possibility of violent
reaction. See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 769, 773 (1960). The essay develops a framework
for asserting and adjusting claims among states, balanced out through standards of reasonableness.
In the context of the law of the sea, the freedoms of the seas, and the testing of the hydrogen bomb,
they observe in language also useful to this paper: "[flor all types of controversies the one test...
is... what, considering all relevant policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as between
the parties. . . ." Id. at 778.
Through the operation and application of this standard upon the claims processes, through
reciprocal interactions, through the establishment and shaping of mutual tolerances, and accordingly
through the processes of unilateral claims among states and reciprocal tolerance, law itself develops
according to McDougal and Schlei. Id. at 773. Customary international law thereby evolves
through the practice of states.
59 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3.
60 I,
61 Id at art. I; see also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 52, at 4.
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will actively and specifically guarantee that the area will remain demilita-
rized. Negative undertakings are set forth; the contracting states under-
take to refrain from various military activities and from the testing of
weapons or conducting nuclear explosions in article I and V.62
Article II serves arms control through a supportive feature because
it makes scientific investigation a primary goal of the contracting states,
and proposes that the results of scientific studies be exchanged on a coop-
erative basis.63 While the practice of the United States and the Soviet
Union may lead to scientific studies that relate to potential military uses
and activities, it is evident that if this article is to serve order-promoting
objectives between them, both their studies and the data exchanged
should be on the freest and most open basis. Article III affords detailed
support to these objectives." Should they be the primary goals, and rea-
sonably approximated, then there will be a good opportunity for Antarc-
tica to be free of tensions and competing claims. Withholding such data,
or the pursuit of studies for strategic advantage leading to clandestine
research, would tend in the opposite direction.
The contracting states have not expressly preserved their rights with
respect to the use of force. This, however, is not an ambiguous element
in the Treaty. The United Nations Charter is expressly included in nu-
merous arms control agreements,6" notably with regard to demilitarized
areas.66 But the Charter is incorporated into the relations of states wher-
ever those relations are established, and applies to their transnational ac-
tivities without exception.67 Accordingly, through articles 2(4) and 51,
and related articles, the Charter preserves the right of self defense, and
includes all the rights under customary international law that make the
use of force permissible. 8
This can only mean that the parties have not chosen to give up this
right, nor even introduced a policy to refrain from the use of force sub-
ject to express reservations relating to the reserved right to self defense as
with the Kellogg-Briand Pact.69 The full implications of the rights of
self-defense can appear only in the practice of states responding to and
62 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, at art I, V.
63 Id. at art II.
64 Id. at art. III.
65 See, eg., The Outer Space Treaty, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
66 Id.
67 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
68 Id. at arts. 2(4), 40, 51, 52, 53.
69 Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy [The Kellogg-Briand Pact], Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. A further possibility is that the Parties to the
Antarctic Treaty may impose a separate treaty regime either by express agreement or simply by
implication. The result would be the establishment of a separate legal order applicable to the conti-
nent governing the use of force. This of course is nothing more than the development of the custom-
ary international law itself, or the imposition of the United Nations Charter, or both, upon the
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reflecting the conditions that cause them to perceive threats to their se-
curity. Moreover, those full implications cannot be confined, except per-
haps through positive or affirmative efforts to reduce the situations from
those of a threat to those of a reasonable, perhaps high, degree of reliance
and confidence among states. We cannot predict, but we can reasonably
assume, that should the contracting states determine that Antarctica pro-
vides an arena in which efforts relating to self-defense are required, then
they will act accordingly. And under these conditions they will recog-
nize as legal, under the Treaty, their activities relating to weapons test-
ing, military exercises and the like, modifying the Treaty through
amendments or otherwise.
Demilitarization in Antarctica is primarily established in Articles I
and V(1) of the Antarctic Treaty:7
Article I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of
military manoeuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
Article V
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of ra-
dioactive material shall be prohibited.
Demilitarization71 under these provisions raises the possibility that
the permitted military personnel and military equipment, though in-
continent, and has the added feature that it would be applicable to all states, and not limited to those
that are party to the Antarctic Treaty.
70 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, was signed in Washington on December 1, 1959, and
entered into force June 23, 1961. A number of states have ratified with a statement declaring their
policy or understandings. See DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 201 (Jan. 1, 1984).
71 See generally B. FERENcZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR
WORLD PEACE (1975). Claims for a "definition" of demilitarization can only accommodate the
policies-usually the opposing policies-of competing states, and the policies that may evolve as
their relations, or as their "vital" or "supreme" interests command. Aggression conveys the supple-
mentary idea established in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 69. The preamble to this pact
declared that the parties were "convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should
be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process." Article I
declared that they condemned "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
The United Nations definition of aggression is limited to providing a form of advice and counsel
to the Security Council pursuant to its competence under article 39 of the Charter to determine "the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." U.N. CHARTER art.
39. The role of the International Court of Justice in these determinations has not yet become clear,
though the Court could be invoked to determine the reach of this provision if the issue were raised
among states.
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tended for neutral "scientific research or for any other peaceful pur-
poses," will necessarily entail development that is neutral as to policy or
policy goals. However, the outcomes may be used for non-neutral mili-
tary purposes if the parties choose to do so. The interaction of technolo-
gies for the sciences and for military activity cannot be divorced from
each other, nor by agreement alone effectively monitored and controlled.
Demilitarization for Antarctica, or for any other arena, must be
shared among the parties to the agreement, since they must guarantee
and monitor that status. While demilitarization may be clearly associ-
ated with setting aside an arena for "peaceful purposes," states reserve
for themselves the right of self-defense and other rights for the use of
force under the United Nations Charter. Thus, demilitarization during
armed conflict is the subject of special agreements among states, and
such agreements would be required during war, notwithstanding the
Antarctic Treaty.
In addition, demilitarization in Antarctica cannot be separated from
other policies adopted among states to govern their relations, including
arms control. Demilitarization is expected to serve similar goals to arms
control, and like arms control in general, its effectiveness depends upon
rivals foregoing their competitive claims with respect to the matters to be
controlled. These objectives were set forth by Richard Nixon in his book
Real Peace.72 Nixon first argued that "detente" with the Soviet Union-
the release of tensions-was dependent upon deterrence, that is, the will
to fulfill U.S. goals in the maintenance of peace:
War can come from five principal sources. It could result if the mili-
tary superiority of an aggressive power were to go unchallenged. It
could result if a leader were to miscalculate what actions by him would
provoke a military response from his opposite number. It could result
if the major powers were drawn in on opposite sides of a war between
minor powers. It could result if a nuclear missile were to be launched
accidentally. It could result if a madman were to capture power and
embark on an aggressive war.73
Recommending that the United States must seek as its "first goal"
the restoration of military balance (i.e., to assure deterrence), Nixon
noted that arms control might then be pursued, with the understanding
that it "cannot be separated from the question of national security."174
An arms control agreement to reduce the risk of war must "advance six
goals": 75 First, it must create a military balance between the superpow-
72 R. NIXON, REAL PEACE 29 (1984).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 37-39. Nixon observes as to the six criteria that arms control agreements will not
contribute to peace unless the political differences that can lead to war are reduced. Hence linkage
with aggression-the SALT II and Afghanistan-was crucial in action "not just in theory." The
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ers.76 Second, it cannot allow either superpower to have a credible first-
strike capability." Third, it must provide the means for each side to
verify the compliance of the other.78 Fourth, it must restrict the testing
of new missile technology that would destabilize the strategic balance.79
Fifth, it must reduce, not merely limit, the nuclear arsenals of the super-
powers.8 0 Sixth, it should allow for replacing fixed, land-based, multi-
balance in arms control agreements must be based on "equality," but equality in numbers is not the
sole criterion. First strike weapons must be denied and prohibited. Technology can be shared, but
only if "true" arms control is achieved (i.e., satisfying the six criteria). Compliance may ultimately
require on-site inspection.
76 Soviet commentators and officials rarely mention deterrence with respect to arms control.
The writings of their military officers emphasize defense almost entirely. The highest officials stress
the general objective of reducing the arms race in outer space and elsewhere, preventing the "milita-
rization of space," and attack the United States for proposing chemical weapons disarmament. See
Chernenko, Replies to Pravda on Arms Race, 22 ATLANTIC Q. 10 (1984). The perspectives on mili-
tarization may tend to be confused with "militarism" in general, and confuse us in assessing the risks
of war in social orders that are readily and rapidly mobilized for war and that possess fully organized
military forces that have been tested through countless exercises. See Radway, Militarism, 10 INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 300 (1968).
77 For earlier commentaries by this author on arms control see, Almond, Deterrence Processes
and Minimum Order, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283 (1983); Almond, The Struggle for A
World Legal Order: An Overview of an Adversary Process, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1977). The Arms
Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 3, 75 Stat. 631 (1961) declares:
As used in this Act-
(a) The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" mean the identification, verification,
inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces and armaments of
all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an
agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and
strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace.
From a policy perspective section 2, describing the "purpose" of arms control and disarmament" for
the United States, is also important. These two sections illustrate the complex interactions between
the branches of the United States government and the perspectives of a government that perceives
arms control as a separate and perhaps somewhat autonomous policy activity promoted through an
agency.
78 The political dimensions (or more accurately the policy dimensions) of arms control appear
in Shultz, Address to the League of Women Voters, May 14, 1984, DEP'T STATE BULL. 28-29 (June
1984). The Secretary pointed out that "preserving peace" requires more of foreign policy than
"avoiding catastrophe." See Bundy, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, in THE APOCALYP-
TIC PREMISE (1982); Kaiser, Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace, in THE APOCALYPTIC
PREMISE (1982).
79 The competitive processes among states have been intensified through the technologies and
increased organizational capabilities at their disposal. Such processes extend far back into the rela-
tions among political entities, and find their source, in part, in the reach for scarce resources, for
controls over persons and territory, and for establishing the bases of power for the purposes of
security. See H. LASswELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950). Power presupposes a
"deference value," and perhaps also presupposes controlling influence over others. "The experiential
data of political science are acts considered as affecting or determining other acts, a relation embod-
ied in the key concept of power. Political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the
shaping and sharing of power." Id. at xiv.
80 The German government, prior to the first World War, perceived itself as a rival and coin-
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warhead missiles with mobile, single-warhead ones. This would elimi-
nate first strike capabilities on both sides.
While it is self-evident that this program for arms control and deter-
rence would necessarily entail a substantial restructuring81 of perspec-
tives and attitudes 2 between the United States and Soviet Union,8" the
Nixon "agreement" is seemingly a framework for effective arms con-
trols,8" and as a framework would offer guidelines as to whether the ac-
tions of either side are stabilizing or destabilizing. 5 If the framework
were given further content, then arms control policies, agreements and
measures-including demilitarization86 of Antarctica--could gradually
petitor to Great Britain in terms of its interests in trade and commerce and justified its expansion
and modernization of its naval forces accordingly. See R. HOUGH, THE GREAT WAR AT SEA
(1914-1918) 4 (1983). Of course, the perspectives, particularly of the Soviet Union, today extend to
even wider, if more abstract, "interests," and embrace the need to defend against all coalitions of
force that might be brought to bear.
81 Trends in Soviet internal or domestic policy clearly impact on the foreign policy of that
state. Ulam, Stalin-Thirty Years Later, The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 4, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
Adam Ulam suggests that the foreign policy component is imperialism, and the domestic component
authoritarian or totalitarian. There appear to be vulnerabilities however in each component.
82 See Ford, The Soviet Union: The Next Decade, 62 FOREIGN APE. 1132 (1984). Ford first
considers the extraordinary use by the Soviet Union of the political and legal principle of "peaceful
coexistence." The Soviets use it as a diplomatic and ideological strategy and combine it with the
threat factor of military support. This principle was formally adopted in a bilateral agreement be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. See Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations,
DE'T STATE BULL. 898-99 (May 29, 1972). Brezhnev stated at the time of signing that the struggle
for "peaceful coexistence" "in no way implies the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle."
Article 24 of the Soviet Constitution of 1977 cemented the foreign policy objective that the principle
would promote the struggle of peoples for national liberation.
83 Nixon concludes his review of present affairs:
The Soviets' goal is to dominate the world. They want to win, but without war. We also
must try to win, but through peace. Our goal should be to engage them in a peaceful
competition between our systems that will foster peaceful change in theirs . . . . Our
strategy for peaceful competition affects all of our global relationships. We must unify the
economic power of the industrial democracies so that we gain political concessions from
the eastern bloc in exchange for our economic cooperation. . . . Unfortunately, the reali-
ties in Eastern Europe force us to accept the fact of Soviet hegemony, but we must never
agree to the principle of it. We cannot set the liberation of the captive nations as our short-
term policy goal, but we must never cease to proclaim it as our long-term goal.
R. NIXON, supra note 72, at 95.
84 Soviet strategy at the highest level can be studied through the documentary records of the
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Their strategy of pursuing Soviet policies
through liberation movements, and through wars of liberation, was enunciated clearly, for example,
in the report by Leonid Brezhnev to the 26th Congress. See Report by Leonid Brezhnev to the 26th
Soviet Congress, 8 CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES 8 (1981).
85 J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES 248-83
(1962) discuss Soviet treaties of non-aggression, neutrality and peace. The non-aggression pacts
made before World War II were either denounced or abrogated by the Soviet Union. These agree-
ments were based upon the implementation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 69, and were
made as part of the Soviet "struggle for peace."
86 The erosion of demilitarization may occur in differing ways depending upon the nature of
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be assimilated, so that the change in perspectives, though gradual, would
be identifiable and manageable.87
The present inquiry pursues the alternative themes suggested here.
One approach for arms control involves the possibility of pursuing a pub-
lic order either between the major rivals or in the global order sense,
following the attempts that led to the League of Nations and the United
Nations.18 The other theme, that of maintaining at least minimum pub-
lic order whose security will be protected against the outbreak of nuclear
war and the ultimate destruction of that order, is a separate, but current,
approach, in which the United States and the Soviet Union are able only
to provide military checks and balances against each other's actions,
communicated through threats and counter-threats. This larger policy
environment is the environment in which demilitarization of Antarctica,
or of the high seas, or outer space, must be considered, and in which
realistic assessments of the claims of the two rivals must be made as they
compete against each other.
Article IV contains potentially harmful impacts with respect to sta-
bilizing Antarctica against becoming a strategic arena.8 9 It seemingly
covers the possessory and territorial claims of the parties while the
Treaty is in force. But it attempts to condition the legal effects or im-
pacts of state practice; i.e., it seems to claim that while states may engage
in activities that might through custom and practice be perfected into
possessory claims, for the purposes of the Treaty at least, they will not be
so treated. Moreover, the article cannot affect what states might do dur-
ing the review or amendment processes, or the possibility that they might
demilitarized arenas: militarization of outer space is almost inherent in the strategic competition
and the strategic arena to be found there; militarization of Svalbard (or Spitzbergen) might occur if
the Soviet presence became so large as to be controlling; militarization of Antarctica might occur
with increased presence of national stations, coupled with the reassertion of territorial claims, or
with the competition over resources, or all of these; and militarization of border areas as with the
Rhineland through claims such as the Germans made of self-defense. The overall relations among
the states today evidence the increased use of surrogates, and also the changing strategic military
instruments applied with respect to changing perspectives of extraterritorial or strategic interests, so
that demilitarization could be affected by organized groups, though this is less likely in Antarctica.
87 One authority in the United States believes that the Soviet Union does not share United
States' goals with respect to arms control and disarmament, but sees the possibility of using the
instruments of that policy as strategic instruments to further Soviet goals relating to communism.
See T. WOLFE, SOVIET STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS (1964).
8 Many of the groups and important figures that have supported world government have been
identified as utopians or idealists whose plans would lead to illusion, and increase the possibility of
tension and warfare. More recently, these individuals have been described as the "coercive utopi-
ans," i.e., those whose "programs, if implemented, will accelerate the decline in our standard of
living, erode our democratic system, and may well result in the loss of genuine national depen-
dence." See R. ISAAC & E. ISAAC, THE COERCIVE UTOPIANS: SOCIAL DECEPTION BY AMERICA'S
POWER PLAYERS 2 (1983); see also W. KurEHL, SEEKING WORLD POWER (1969).
89 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IV.
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reject the treaty if they believe that their interests in establishing territo-
rial or substantial possessory claims outweigh their interests in preserv-
ing the arena as a "global commons. '"90
Article V clearly forbids nuclear explosive devices, whether ex-
ploded for peaceful or military purposes.9 1 It also establishes indirectly
the possibility that nuclear power plants, or the use of nuclear power in
general, in the area must be precluded.92 It is ambiguous with respect to
nuclear powered vessels or submersibles. Article VI limits the area cov-
ered by the Treaty, excluding the high seas.93 Because the continental
shelves and the potential for an "exclusive economic zone" remain un-
clear, these will become matters that will need attention at the review
conferences. If resolved for substantial exploitation close to Antarctica,
they are likely to have a destabilizing effect on state relations to the ex-
tent that they lead to competition regarding the resources in the zone.
Article VII provides for monitoring and verifying related activities
of the parties.94 It is dependent upon the parties providing for free and
open visits and exchange of observers which is a matter that may either
be promoted or discouraged in state practice. If the parties find means to
exploit the ambiguities in the provision, or refrain from cooperative prac-
tices, they will ultimately undermine the stabilizing thrust of this provi-
sion. But the provision as drafted is unlimited with respect to what may
be monitored and verified. It would require compliance with demilitari-
zation i.e., on site and full inspection of all activities, stressing those ac-
tivities that might lead to a breakdown in the treaty.9 It extends to all
areas, to all facilities,96 in part to assure that they are not "military"
facilities, though article I permits military personnel to carry out activi-
ties at stations on the continent.97 It extends to all ships and aircraft, 95
permitting the use of aerial observations,9 9 and requiring only prior no-
tice of the investigatory activities."° It is a more extensive verification
provision than that to be found in the arms control agreements, largely
because it affords on-site inspection without conditions or qualifications.
Article X imposes the United Nations Charter on the parties.101
However, article X also declares that the parties assure that no one is to
90 Id.
91 Id. at art. V.
92 Id.
93 Id. at art. VI.
94 Id. at art. VII.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at art. I.
98 Id. at art. VII.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at art. X.
Vol. 17:229
DEMILITARIZATION
engage "in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or pur-
poses of the present Treaty.""0 2 The reference to purposes is ambiguous.
Its reach will depend upon whether the parties share in processes for
maintaining the continent for peaceful purposes as a global commons and
in keeping it fully demilitarized. Article XI supports the peaceful, coop-
erative ambit of the Treaty through its provisions for the application of
article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which ensures the peaceful res-
olution of disputes and provides for recourse to the International Court
of Justice, subject to the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of that
Court. 103
B. Antarctic Claims Processes Among States
States are perceived as making and exchanging claims and counter-
claims regarding all aspects of their relations: their policies, claims to
power, influence, and prestige, their claims to values and the legitimacy
of their claims regarding the value demands of peoples, and their claims
to law itself. From these activities states form their relations and per-
spectives relevant to these relations and activities. Through these
processes they encounter their competitive demands on each other.
From the outcomes of these processes, nation-states establish their toler-
ances, and these tolerances are the key element in the development of
their law. Inherent in these processes is the unraveling of states' de-
mands on each other, their identifications with values and value de-
mands, and their expectations. Law, policy and strategy flow from the
processes, and thus afford us the framework of inquiry into the develop-
ment of policy in the largest sense by discerning the extent to which pol-
icy can be shared. Noting the trends and conditioning factors that have
shaped policy in the past and extrapolating into the future, we are af-
forded an operative inquiry process that enables us to innovate appropri-
ate policy and decision alternatives for the future. This framework of
inquiry has been developed by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his
associates,1" and is applied to the analysis in the present section to de-
102 Id
103 Id. at art. XI. Only tenuous reliance can be expected on decisions of the International
Court of Justice (IC) with respect to issues involving the use of force. An international court,
constituted like the ICJ, can neither dictate nor even formulate such a complex problem as that
regarding the use of force because states must find through their practice and relations what will
exemplify their shared expectations. They can do so in many areas, but in the use of force we are left
largely-as in the law of war-with general, abstract standards and conclusions. The problems the
Court faces here are "wicked problems," as discussed earlier, supra note 19. For illustration of the
difficulties in defining aggression, see Aggression: Conceptual Issues, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIC Dic-
TIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 13 (R. Harr6 & R. Lamb eds. 1983); B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNA-
TIONAL AGGRESSION (1975).
104 M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE Xvi-xvii (1967).
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militarization and to its strategic implications.
While states engage in claims imposed upon each other, states' legal
order presupposes that they have a shared policy, along with common
goals and interests. The effectiveness of the legal order and the support
through that order of demilitarization depends upon the accommodation
of policies and relations that are in general hostile and adversarial be-
tween the Communist states on the one hand, and the Western states
including Japan on the other. 105 Interpretation, along with the law-pro-
jecting activities of application and invocation of the Antarctic Treaty,
depends upon the parties establishing on a continuing basis their shared
expectations. 10 6
Clearly the parties, even after they have entered into their agree-
ments, continue in their practice and relations to introduce further
claims in particular with respect to the agreements themselves. Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes that:
[T]here shall be taken into account, together with the context ... (a)
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-
tation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subse-
quent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties . ... 107
With respect to the written undertakings in international treaties
and agreements, and with respect to other communications, including
communications in any form, these authorities are stressing the changing
relations and the changing claims that are inherent in the practice of
states. Like the United States Constitution, the written documents de-
mand the flexibility of reasonable change. Otherwise, they would need to
be replaced on a continuing basis. That flexibility is established through
the continuing impacts of claims, through a "subsequent practice" which
molds and develops the "law" of the treaty to fit the shared expectations,
and through expectations themselves that the parties are adjusting and
accommodating policies or relations that cannot be wholly fixed by legal-
istic instruments. While some agreements lend themselves to, and are
compelled to assume, restrictive interpretations, particularly those that
105 Id. at 27-29.
106 Id. The authors further stress that relying exclusively on the text-on the treaty text or
upon the texts of international agreements alone-would be "the grossest, least defensible exercise of
arbitrary formalism." Id. at xvii. The authors seek out a far wider reach among participants to
establish community expectations than those that might be among the few selected as spokesmen of
a given government in negotiating and concluding the treaty text. Id. The same approach men-
tioned here for interpretation extends to the process of application. Id. at xix.
107 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27.
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are security-sensitive, the multilateral agreements, and in particular those
that lead to the constitution of public order, call out for liberal interpre-
tations. These liberal interpretations are required to assume that the fun-
damental purpose of order is not impaired or jeopardized by claims for a
strategic advantage, and for a claims process that promotes such claims.
The flexible and progressive nature of international law is a factor in
assessing both customary international law and the law of treaties. Arti-
cle 31 of the Vienna Convention refers to "relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties,"108 and necessarily
includes those rules that might affect relations that have arisen after the
treaty has been concluded. While the legislative practices of the United
States, for example, are not incorporated into international law as such,
it is at least arguable that the changing international law may affect the
law of treaties when there is an inconsistency between the two. This is
one of the features attributable to the jus cogens, and perhaps would in-
clude new international law that the parties are both claiming, and shar-
ing, to be made applicable by them (by implication) to their treaties. To
a certain extent acquiescence in activities that are questionable under the
arms control agreements, or even violative of the agreements, might lead
the parties through that process of claims, and even though the process is
in part tacit, to modify the agreement itself. With regard to the bilateral
commitments, at least, the parties can through a shared understanding
"look the other way" as to some of the provisions, or some of the inter-
pretations, or with respect to some of the undertakings that are deemed
to be "ambiguous" and therefore subject to development through
practice.
Some scholars have noted that there is a progressive and developing
international law and international justice.109 The experience of two
costly world wars have stimulated a need that civilized mankind convert
moral ideas into recognized laws. 110 These scholars assume that the peo-
ples throughout the world have already begun adopting widening per-
spectives concerning the optimization of opportunities and social orders
dedicated to human dignity. The term "civilized mankind" is used in
such a sense, so that a part of this shared perspective concerning interna-
tional law is that the values will be those associated with human dignity
and not with intensifying and concentrating the claims of a few to naked
power.
The deterrence processes, along with a general shared military strat-
egy, and the balancing processes engaging self defense are among the
differing options that may be adopted by states, or forced upon them, as
108 Id.
109 Wright, War Crimes Under International Law, 51 LAW Q. REv. 51 (1946).
110 Id.
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part of their ordering processes. While such processes lack the authority
and perhaps the control of law itself, they have some of the indicia of
law, and they contain policy content that gives them some "substance"
analogous to law itself.11' The ordering processes just mentioned differ
from each other in their goals. Deterrence differs from other processes in
that it seeks order through equilibria processes involving weapons,
threats and defense, affording its limited order through what little stabil-
ity may be maintained once hostilities break out.
All of these processes can support the legal order among states, and
be shared by them. When they are supportive of law, they give the law
greater strength in general, and particularly through enforcement meas-
ures when all are willing to share in the overall interests of the global
community. But the processes can also impose limitations on the further
growth of law if rival states are able only to maintain order through the
deterrence equilibrium and are unable to build further upon that order.
Moreover, strongly exclusive components in a system of defense policies
projected among nations can be self-defeating because defense and ag-
gression depend upon the observer and the claimants, and because esca-
lation of violence under the claims of self-defense may lead to irrational
behavior or perceptions. Yet defense and the balancing of states who
claim the right to maintain defensive postures, even in present circum-
stances where a major nuclear war might be "irrational," are inevitable
in the relations among states that have not achieved a global order and
the security expected in such order. Deterrence expected to sustain de-
militarization in Antarctica, or elsewhere, is dependent upon states mov-
ing far closer to shared policies than are required in their other arms
control efforts, because so much depends upon their guaranteeing, by
force if necessary, the demilitarized status. 12
It is evident that the United States and the Soviet Union, either bi-
laterally, or multilaterally, are currently engaged in an informal process,
seeking and shaping the indicia of minimum public order by their grad-
ual adherence to and molding of the deterrence components into a shared
strategy. These states, through arms control policies, based upon mutual
awareness, if not fear, of the destructiveness of major strategic weapons,
are also invoking and strengthening the indicia of public order presup-
posed by such policies.
Public orders, maintaining in reasonable balance confrontational sit-
uations even for a prolonged period of time are not unknown in history.
But even in this process the United States and the Soviet Union are grad-
11 See generally G. SNYDER, DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE (TOWARD A THEORY OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY) (1961); McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952); RESTRARIS
ON WAR (Howard ed. 1979).
112 Luard, Who Owns the Antarctic?, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1175 (1984).
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ually directing themselves toward an ultimate goal that can sustain and
be sustained by demilitarization efforts in Antarctica and elsewhere both
in weapons control or in orienting weapons toward peaceful activities.
The overall logic of their stand-off with nuclear weapons is that the use of
such weapons escalates or can escalate to a point approaching unlawful-
ness. The shared expectation gradually forming may be that such unlaw-
fulness in use (the threats to use aside) arises because the weapons cannot
be legally controlled beyond deterrence. Of course the full implications
for global order or global "peace" from this set of relations remain
indecisive.113
When hostilities are pursued in the traditional sense, i.e., as they
have been pursued in the past, the principle of the economy of force ap-
plies to all weapons. This principle applies because, as an operating prin-
ciple, it is presupposed that destruction would not be absolute.114 But
such a principle may be inapplicable to weapons of mass destruction if
stretched beyond its operational limits. Then the impacts on law from
the use of such weapons in sustained attacks or attacks causing universal,
severe, and long-lasting destruction may parallel the physical impacts in
the use of such weapons. With the destruction of what people have built
into their civilizations and destruction of their social orders, we would no
longer be able to speak intelligibly about law.
A common assumption is that deterrence is a continuing process
only of balanced or reciprocated threats, and remains effective as such.
It is assumed never to be a process of reciprocated uses of weapons (at
least of weapons of the destructive force of the major nuclear weapons).
In traditional legal concepts such a balancing process is easily identified
as a threat of aggression, but this is too facile a characterization. The
threats are more justly characterized as mutual in nature, with a mutual
goal. That goal is minimum public order itself, even if that order is seem-
ingly fragile under such a system. In any event, the assumption that
threats, but not uses, may be contemplated both for law and policy, com-
ports with two claims: first, that there may be a deterrence against use
that provides the current order short of hostilities, and second, that de-
terrence during the use of weapons (i.e., during hostilities) is deterrence
aimed only at moderating the destruction otherwise permitted by war
itself.
Interaction of defense and deterrence strategies is inevitable, though
each has some impact in arenas covering policy and decisions that are
mutually exclusive. Defense strategies necessarily engage capabilities be-
113 See generally ARON, PEACE AND WAR (A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
(1966). Aron declares that three "peace" categories may be adopted for global orders. These are:
(1) peace by equilibrium; (2) peace by hegemony; and (3) peace by empire.
114 de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 38 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 9 (1952).
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yond those demanded for deterrence because they necessarily involve ca-
pabilities to pursue and, presumably, to survive an armed conflict. The
intermediate zone-defense strategies designed to provide a basis for ne-
gotiations during hostilities but not necessarily to enable one side to pre-
vail or survive-have not been closely appraised at the present time.
Moreover, it is not yet clear how far the "linkage" if any, between de-
fense strategies and capabilities on the one hand and the lesser needs for
deterrence strategies and capabilities on the other, extends.
All of these strategies provide the "umbrella" under which demilita-
rization as a shared strategy for Antarctica is appraised. But they com-
pel the subordination of demilitarization, both as a general strategy of
relations among states and as an effective measure of arms control, which
is a specific strategy of relations among states, to that of the fundamental
relations themselves. We are always thrown back to fundamental rela-
tions of major rivals that inevitably must address and provide some mo-
dus vivendi concerning their competitive processes in general, and their
tolerances regarding the uses or the support of the uses of force as strate-
gic instruments in shaping states' relations.
Given this need for flexible and ever changing processes, the analysis
of the claims process is projected toward those claims among states fol-
lowing the framework of Professor W. Michael Reisman."' As Profes-
sor Reisman indicates, the process extends across a wide spectrum of
communications among the participants-it includes demands and re-
sponse, activities identified with a decision process and the enforceability
of those decisions.' 16 The process of claims in this framework includes
claimants, their perspectives, situations in which the strategies and
claims are presented among the participants, and the strategic modalities
and procedures in which claims are set forth. This analytical framework
enables us to envision the complex interaction of policy that extends to
the process, as well as the emergence from the claims made and coun-
tered of the tolerances that lead to authority and control with respect to
future decisions and actions.
1. Claimants
Claimants among the participants in Antarctica pursue both exclu-
sive and inclusive strategies for strategic and policy goals. Foremost
among the participants or players in Antarctica today are the nation-
states. The area has not been sufficiently established for commercial en-
terprise. Claimants are likely to include international or inter-govern-
mental organizations, the various agencies and organs of the United
115 See Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ESSAYS 142 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981).
116 Id. at 159.
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Nations, and others as the activities among states accelerate. Claims by
the lesser developed countries already associated with such projected
principles as the "common heritage of mankind," and claims of blocs
through alliances, allegiances and common commitments are likely to
arise if states find that individually they cannot achieve goals such as
increased participation in the decisions affecting the continent, or if they
require the groupings for raising capital for enterprise.
Claims by scientific groups, either for continued and unrestricted
freedom for scientific investigation or for freedom from encroachments
by enterprises that might lead to severe impacts upon the ecology or en-
vironment, are to be expected. Claims by private groups or entities pri-
marily for enterprise or commercial activity will quickly arise once the
continent is opened to exploitation for its resources or wealth. Claims
from the socialist countries regarding enterprise are most likely to come
from the trading instruments; the state trading entities of those countries.
2. Perspectives
The claimants present in Antarctica, the nation-states, are already
engaged in relations that are adversarial or competitive elsewhere on
earth. The perspectives of these claimants (including the values that they
identify as most significant), their demands on each other (and on their
citizens), and their expectations particularly respecting use of force (or
associated with what they expect from cooperative activities or from
maintaining peaceful relations), are major factors in establishing the de-
velopment of law that they will share. The Western nations and the
Communist states have now begun to freeze their opposing value expec-
tations.' 17 There are strong tendencies in the West to reassert the values
of human dignity, while the Communist states are reaffirming their need
for security, protected in large measure through naked power itself.
The claims process where the two rival blocs of states are actively
involved in presenting claims and demands for the purpose of responses
that might lead to favorable outcomes is ultimately aimed at a conver-
gence in the overall process. Hence, the goal is a "more inclusive author-
ity system" in which the rivals share expectations and tolerances about
their behavior and policy. 18 However, realistic perceptions compel at-
tention to the continuing hostility, and to manifestations of military ac-
tions that, based on past trends in the patterns of behavior of other states,
could lead to tensions and perhaps conflict. Accordingly, the differences
in perspectives may lead to the claims process and the search for accom-
modation, but the differences if intractable or treated as such could lead
to more serious escalation of the conflict itself.
117 Id. at 158.
118 Id. at 159.
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There are conflicts which precipitate claims, but these are largely
due to the differences in perspectives of each claimant. 11 9 However, these
differences come together and join in the claim processes due to the more
inclusive authority system in which they seek to participate. 120 The very
act of claim processing reinforces this authority for both claimants and
decision makers. 121 The strategies appear both inside and outside the
claims process itself; claims may be asserted through a variety of strate-
gic instruments.
122
3. Situations.
Claimants pursue their strategies in a variety of situations. The situ-
ations, which are the loci of the claims processes, include the fora and
institutions established for such processes, disputes, and disagreements
appearing in articles IX, XI, and XII of the Antarctic Treaty.1 23 The
claims may also be entertained in the United Nations fora, including
those of the agencies and organs, or in fora established pursuant to article
33 of the United Nations Charter. Because these situations are at times
controlled by the parties, the parties' choice of those situations in which
the processes may take place may determine the outcomes. Professor
Reisman observes that "situations have great influence on the form and
content of a claim, and the investigator may require entirely different sets
of tools for identifying claims in different situations."124
With regard to Antarctica, the participants may be unsure of them-
selves in the consultative meetings, or be unable to expect the outcomes
they desire; the meetings are thus limited to superficial matters. 12' Dis-
putes over compliance with the Antarctic Treaty provisions, with the free
exchange of scientific investigators, or with issues ranging around prior
consent may require negotiation among the groups involved. More se-
119 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
120 Reisman, supra note 115, at 159.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3.
124 Reisman, supra note 115, at 159.
125 See Joyner, Anglo-American Rivalry After the Falklands/Malvinas War: Laws, Geopolitics;
and the Antarctic Connection, 15 LAW. Am. 467 (1984). Joyner discusses the various efforts of the
Consultative Party system under article IX of the Antarctica Treaty and points out that the present
system using consultative efforts is preferable to alternatives. Id at 499. Evan Luard suggests that
the competition over the resources in the Antarctica might lead to conflict and that the present
consultative system will not work where only a few countries participate and where the Treaty itself
does not include some 130 nations. Luard, supra note 112, at 1184-88. Luard recommends a re-
source management regime superimposed upon the existing treaty, while recognizing that the treaty
itself may be superannuated. Id. at 1188-92. See generally Joyner, Oceanic Pollution and the South-
ern Ocean: Rethinking the International Legal Implications for Antarctica, 24 NATURAL RE-
SOURCES J. 40 (1984).
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vere allegations of violation, such as those relating to the demilitarization
of the continent, would quickly escalate to the diplomatic fora, probably
between the foreign ministers or heads of state. While the Antarctic
Treaty has provisions for a variety of fora,126 and while the parties might
be able to draw upon other fora such as those mentioned above, it ap-
pears that such agreements must be drafted with a view toward future
disputes and differences. If analyzed comprehensively, it appears that
the institutions and procedures that might be shaped and adopted would
be among the most important considerations in treaty making. They
would not be treated as matters, following earlier precedents, that are
added at the close of the negotiations as the "final clauses," or as
"boilerplate."
4. Strategies
States employ strategies to achieve, promote, or project their poli-
cies. While current strategies extend substantially beyond military strat-
egy, (in large measure because of the advent of deterrence as a
fundamental strategy), states are compelled to turn to other instruments
to project their policies. Strategy at one time meant merely commanding
the military and preparing for war.127 Strategy is no longer a wartime
concept, but now includes consideration of nonmilitary factors such as,
economic, political and technological considerations. Strategy is now an
inherent part of statecraft which controls the resources of a nation, in-
cluding military resources, to achieve a vital end.
States and other participants communicate claims through a variety
of strategies and strategic instruments. Examples of strategies include
law and legal processes, the legal instruments that convey law and policy
among states, and the communications that achieve this conveyance in
general. All of the strategic instruments of policy are available to states
to be designed, shaped and aimed at the appropriate goals. But it bears
emphasis that these are strategies that may be aimed at inclusive goals; in
short at a public order expected to be shared and through the actions and
deci§ions of the states translated into being. And the same states perhaps
126 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
127 E. EARLE, MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY (MILITARY THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI
TO HITLER) viii (1943). Other essays on strategy in this volume provide further insights of major
contributors to the study of strategy. The author cites Alexander Hamilton. Id at 117-18. Hamil-
ton was enunciating a basic principle of statecraft when he said that safety from external danger is
"the most powerful director of national conduct;" even liberty must, if necessary, give way to the
dictates of security, because to be more safe men are willing "to run the risk of being less free." THE
FEDERALIST No. 8 (A. Hamilton). Adam Smith and Friedrich List are cited in the same passage.
E. EARLE, supra, at 117-18. Adam Smith, who believed the material prosperity of the nation to be
founded upon a minimum of governmental interference with the freedom of the individual, was
willing to concede that this general principle must be compromised when national security is in-
volved, for "defense is of much more importance than opulence." Id
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concurrently or separately may introduce exclusive strategies, aimed
once again at the minimum order of a confrontational claims process.
The strategies, in short, as they are set out in the claims processes, deter-
mine whether those processes are strengthened toward order (or toward
at most a minimum order), in which the adversaries in Antarctica are
gradually adjusting their relations to competition and competitive strug-
gle with prospects of military confrontation and conflict.
In the arms control sense the strategies of states, whether designed
for deterrence or to lessen the likelihood of establishing strategic arenas
in areas such as Antarctica, ultimately are shared. As noted, the claims
process itself may lead to converging perspectives, and this will likely
lead to the appeal of a more inclusive authority system. 128 The strate-
gies, even if opposing, may lead to a common strategy that is shared.
This would be true even if the "ground rules" turn out to be those relat-
ing to how the confrontation among rivals is to take place. The outcome
of strategies presented as claims, from the interdependence and in-
terdeterminancies of decision, the shared strategy, both conditions and
determines the actions of the rivals or players. 129 The business of action
and response, of claim and counterclaim, produces at least a rudimentary
basis in law, even if not readily perceived as such. 30
128 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
129 The term "strategy" is taken here from the theory of games, which distinguishes games of
skill, games of chance, and games of strategy, the latter being those in which the best course of action
for each player depends on what the other players do. The term is intended to focus on the interde-
pendence of the adversaries' decisions and on their expectations about each other's behavior. This is
not the military usage.
130 T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIcT 3 (1960). The "strategy" shared here among
states, and aimed at common interests or identified as the process of emerging common interests, is a
threat-counter-threat process: the resulting and slowly developing public order that rivals share
comes about through an accommodation that they force upon each other, at first with regard to the
major nuclear weapons and then, presumably, by the reciprocal tolerance associated with other
weapons, linked perhaps with the nuclear weapons equilibrium. Rational behavior, communications
at least at the necessary minimum, and compliance processes are all factors in the operation of this
strategy. As indicated earlier in this paper, supra notes 13-54 and accompanying text, this is a
strategy of converging interests, and is not the same as the exclusive military strategies, even though
it may be the outcome of unilateral claims and strategies intended by the possessors for more exclu-
sive goals. The complex business of a strategy relating to the termination of agreements or under-
standings among states for demilitarization or arms control, associated with the application of the
perspective of a fundamental change in circumstances, is assessed by A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF
TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS (1975). The strategy of imperial
Rome co-opting client states in a hegemonial base is reviewed in E. LUTrWAK, THE GRAND STRAT-
EGY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE: FROM THE FIRST CENTURY A.D. TO THE THIRD (1976). Modern
strategies and the assessment of those strategies call for trend analysis, because the historical in-
stances, while showing the formulation of attitudes among policy-makers in general, are unique
instances. Trend analysis, according to Professors McDougal and Lasswell is "concerned with spe-
cific features of the future that are ever emerging from the past," and the analyst "needs to be
especially sensitive to time, and to forecast with reasonable accuracy passage from one configuration
of events to the next." H. LASSWELL & M. McDoUGAL, Legal Education and Public Policy: Profes-
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According to Schelling, states have turned from military strategy
and the use of military capabilities in combat (particularly where they are
equally matched), because "the instruments of war are more punitive
than acquisitive." 13' States have turned military strategy into projecting
coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Deterrence is based upon inten-
tions; influencing the intentions and actions of the opposition. Your de-
terrent actions must be persuasive, or else it will sound like a bluff; not
having much deterrent effect.
Strategies may be communicated in various ways through diplo-
macy, negotiations, bargaining and other means of communication estab-
lished through negotiation, or pursuant to the traditional state practice.
Strategies may also be communicated through actions; actions may be
addressed directly or indirectly. The adoption of legislation, appropria-
tions and authorization relating to weapons, for example, may affect the
policies and future communications. The legislative process, being a
sional Training in the Public Interest, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 54-55 (1960). More-
over, "the results of trend-thinking must continually be evaluated by the policy-maker in the light of
his goals; the task is to think creatively about how to alter, deter, or accelerate probable trends in
order to shape the future closer to his desire." Id.
131 T. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 34-35 (1966). Schelling points out that the notions
of Clausevitz found their counterpart in the major instruments concerning war. For example, the
Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868 declared that the "only legitimate object which states should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." Id. at 26. Schel-
ling suggests that the trends in the practice of states is toward enlarging this "military object," so
that populations in World War II became such an object where they supported the war effort. More-
over, the "political element" of Clausewitz carried forward so that political objectives became con-
fused or amalgamated with military objectives, leading to what appeared to be the increased
tolerance for destruction in World War II (i.e., where that tolerance is examined against the lawfull-
ness of violence in that war). From this stage to deterrence, the mix of "political" and "military"
and of policy and law appear in an equilibrium where the seriousness of war and its potential for
destruction becomes the deterrent, while deterrence, practiced in peacetime or in the absence of
hostilities, is then a checks and balancing process among rivals in this "third" stage in the develop-
ment of global perspectives concerning violence. According to Schelling:
[Tihis third stage can be analyzed into two quite different variants. In one, sheer pain and
damage are primary instruments of coercive warfare and may actually be applied, to intim-
idate or deter. In the other, pain and destruction in war are expected to serve little or no
purpose but prior threats of sheer violence, even of automatic and uncontrolled violence,
are coupled to military force. The difference is in the all-or-none character of deterrence
and intimidation. Two acute dilemmas arise. One is the choice of making prospective
violence as frightening as possible or hedging with some capacity for reciprocated restraint.
The other is the choice of making retaliation as automatic as possible or keeping deliberate
control over the fateful decisions. The choices are determined partly by governments, partly
by technology ....
Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added). Schelling has shown the larger lines of policy and decision, and the
problems that arise when rivals believe that within the context of this framework they have separate
degrees of freedom not conditioned as to the outcome of their threats or hostilities in which they
deliberately choose and deliberately seek goals using force short of the most destructive weapons.
The guarantee of demilitarization by the use of force thus becomes suspect. The "deliberate control"
over fateful decisions becomes the driving force and goal of effective arms control.
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communications process, is subject (at least in a free society) to manipu-
lation and to participation by special interest groups, including foreign
lobbies. Legislation may affect the deployment and the production and
testing of weapons, as well as their modernization.
The instruments of strategy (the design of the capabilities and mate-
rial resources and the strategic policy) may go hand in hand. Thus, a
nation seeking to promote exclusive strategies for commanding strategic
advantage can adapt its ideological, diplomatic, economic and military
instruments of strategy. These factors may outweigh decisions dictated
through scarce resources, and may determine the timing choices. For
example, the Soviet Union, in its challenge toward the Western legal
processes and the values implicit in them, has promoted the consensual
principle, the principle of peaceful coexistence, and the Brezhnev doc-
trines. 132 Because Soviet perspectives envisage the demise of the capital-
ist system and its replacement by communism, and because these
perspectives lead to an activist role, the principles just mentioned become
both legal principles and principles supporting the larger policy of the
Soviet Union.
Thus, customary international law becomes recognized by the Soviet
Union if subjected to prior consent of the Soviet Union.133 The principle
of peaceful coexistence legitimatizes the wars of liberation against the
bourgeois societies and the Brezhnev Doctrine establishes the socialist
commonwealth of states as an entity separate from and outside the inter-
national legal order.1 34 A member cannot withdraw from this order and
attempts to withdraw can be forcibly opposed by the other members. 135
Similar innovative challenges to the legal order in Antarctica can be en-
visaged, unless the Communist and Western states reach a shared policy
and common goals for the continent.
5. Specific Claims
1. Global Order Claims
States, in their relations and transnational activities, pursue their
own goals and those goals associated with establishing order, but they
may choose to seek only that form of public order that is congenial to
their ideologies and to the value demands that they are promoting. The
132 See R. EDMONDS, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: THE BREZHNEV YEARS 72-73, 118-19 (1983);
Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, DEP'T STATE BULL. 394-401 (Oct.
14, 1968). See generally M. GEHLEN, THE POLITICS OF Co-ExIsTENCE (1967); Nitze, Living with
the Soviets, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 360 (1984-85).
133 See Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, supra note 132.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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Soviet Union clearly pursues its own global order processes and claims
that the Western states are pursuing others. The Soviets view Western
goals as being not only hostile to those of the Soviet Union, but inconsis-
tent with the Marxist-Leninist outcomes that are the only ones the Soviet
Union is willing to support. Entirely different cultural experiences, tradi-
tions and processes in the Soviet Union and in Russia distinguish the
perspectives of that nation from those of the West. These differences also
affect the differing perspectives among communist states that have their
traditions in Western values.
"Liberty" in the sense of freedom to participate, freedom to share in
controlling decisions, and freedom to establish the perspectives of au-
thority among all the peoples in America was the leading theme behind
the American revolution.' 36 All of the founding fathers were in agree-
ment that liberty was their goal and that the safeguards must be national
in scope and power.137
This theme does not appear in the 20th Century revolutions. Those
revolutions have been driven instead by utopian claims, and then fulfilled
through centralized, bureaucratic and totalitarian systems which deny
these freedoms. These "utopias" appear to have neither the appropriate
cultural base nor the wide-ranging social perspectives necessary to sus-
tain and promote the social order processes associated with such goals.
The Communist revolutions, or Marxist revolutions, are utopian in goals,
but elitist in rule.138 Nevertheless, all actions and decisions among West-
ern and Communist social orders include both those that relate to work-
ing within the existing public order, as well as those that relate to
establishing the constitutive base that will create and allocate authority
and competence which is so essential to a sustained public order. In
these decisions, as in the decision flow itself, are to be found the claims
processes, evidencing the challenge and threat from the two major blocs
that oppose each other today. 139
2. Claims to Regulate the Use of Force
Major claims and strategies with regard to state relations concern
the regulation of the use of force. While regulation for global order per-
spectives would employ community policies reflecting these perspectives
where the challenge relates to the global order itself, there are, in opposi-
tion, claims that would make force permissible to revolutionize and re-
136 J. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 33-34 (1983).
137 Id.-
138 See W. KULSKI, PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
4-13 (1959).
139 See H. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH AND THE
PROBLEMS OF PEACE 1812-22, at 1-3 (1954).
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place the existing global order emanating from the Communist doctrine,
and claims that would make force permissible exclusively to satisfy the
policies associated with the existing global order. Because these claims
and competitive challenges constitute the framework in which the rela-
tions of states are currently perceived, there are marked differences in
what uses of force are permissible (lawful, or "legitimate"). The Soviet
Union insists that wars of liberation are "just wars," and that the use of
force in those activities seeking self-determination and escape from the
colonial rule (which rule is, by definition, exclusively imposed through
capitalist systems) are legitimate." The Soviets claim that the individu-
als involved are "freedom fighters" entitled to legal protections and privi-
leges, and that opposition to such activities is a form of aggression.1 41
The Soviet Union also insists that once states are drawn into the closer-
knit group of states whose foreign policy has become that established by
the Soviet Union, the Brezhnev Doctrine applies (being applicable then
to a "socialist commonwealth of states").142 In the Soviet view, the
Brezhnev Doctrine entitles the Soviet Union, along with other members
of the commonwealth, to take the necessary action, including military
intervention and military action, in order to maintain and protect the
commonwealth even from internal disruption of the communist social
order. 143
These differing perspectives lead in turn to perspectives that are so
different among the Communist and Western nations as to make at-
tempts at "defining" aggression, or regulating the use of force against
standards that determine its permissibility, extremely tenuous. It is
likely that should force be required in Antarctica, or should war or
armed combat break out on the continent, the demilitarization of the
area would cease. The arena would then become a strategic arena, and
the applicable law would fall back into claims and counterclaims, appear-
ing primarily as threats and counter-threats justified by both sides in
terms of "self defense," with allegations by both that their rivals were
"aggressors." 144
140 See generally R. MITCHELL, IDEOLOGY OF A SUPERPOWER: CONTEMPORARY SOVIET
DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982); N. MATHESON, THE 'RULES OF THE GAME'
OF SUPERPOWER MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE WORLD 1975-1980 (1982).
141 Cf Nitze, supra note 132; N. MATHESON, supra note 140.
142 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
143 See Almond, The Struggle for a World Order: An Overview of the Adversary Process, 16
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977).
144 The right that states have reserved with respect to self-defense is a "fundamental" right,
tending to override all other perspectives and expectations among states in their relations. It tends
to override their expectations regarding the security to be afforded by a public order, unless of course
they are in control of that public order as they are internally. The right is incorporated in the
United Nations Charter at article 51 and in the larger claims that invoke that right under customary
international law. The right they invoke has its parallel in the expectations of what states are free to
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3. Claims to Regulate the Use of Weapons
Claims to regulate the use of weapons among states are established
primarily under the framework of the law of war. The law of war is
composed largely of customary international law, or of the customary
international law embraced within treaties and international agree-
ments.1 45 Pursuant to the Geneva Protocols of 1977, which draw upon
this customary international law, states would be expected to enter into
special agreements during wartime to ensure that demilitarized zones re-
main free of combat operations.1 46  These claims extend broadly; they
move beyond the weapons to claims affecting what targets might be at-
tacked, what methods of attack might be undertaken, how much force
(proportionality) may be used to pursue an attack, and what conditions
determine the right to use the weapons and to conduct the attacks during
combat (military necessity). While the law and authority system regulat-
do to protect or defend themselves and their interests. With the threats that are facing them, their
arms control balancing efforts must assimilate their security perspectives and this simply means that
states will not refrain from pursuing whatever measures and whatever weaponry appear to be needed
for security and defense purposes, even while they are pursuing arms control policies. It may be said
that arms control policy is a changing policy depending upon how far states are willing to share a
public order and the security it offers to replace their claims on self-defense. In any event, the claims
for self defense are so far reaching that it is unlikely that an antisatellite agreement could exclude at
least some measures for defending space objects, or using space objects for defending their interests
in general. It cannot be too emphatically stressed that the claims process among states determines
the development of both law and order among them and that their treaties and agreements today
very pointedly reserve their rights to self defense, either directly or by incorporating the United
Nations Charter, and then either expressly or by implication.
145 Arms control policy is still at a stage in which broad or generalized principles constitute the
fundamental framework of the agreements, even though specific weapons are identified. This arises
out of two factors: even when specific language is used, the parties will pursue the ambiguities of
policy inherent in the provisions and language if necessary for their vital purposes. Second, even
though they seek specifically to cover identifiable weaponry, the parties cannot achieve arms control
unless they reach very deeply into controlling the use of force through legal measures and regulation.
The relationship, then, between arms control, controls presently imposed by the jus ad bellum, or
law relating to aggression, and even the jus in bello, or law relating to the conduct of hostilities, is a
relationship based upon inhibitions concerning the use of force. However, attempts in arms control
agreements to regulate the use of force have two-fold difficulties. If such regulation continues to be
through promissory restraints on the use of force, that regulation amounts to a restraint exclusively
on decisions, and enforcement is extremely tenuous. Second, because it is sought through arms
control agreements, it becomes an issue of verification, and there is no way to verify a violation of
conduct not to do a thing, except when the prohibited conduct is occurring. In short, there is no
extra-enforcement "measure" identifiable in terms of the agreement as there is, for example, with
nuclear weapons, where both sides are presently perceived to share their fear of intolerable destruc-
tion in the event of use. With those agreements there is the possibility of enforcement during war-
time, but not with arms control agreements relating to weapons that may be destructive, but have
military utility.
146 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CoNFLICrs 586-87 (D. Schindler & J. Toman 2d ed. 1981).
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ing these activities among states would apply to Antarctica in the same
manner as elsewhere, the issue remains open as to whether the Antarctic
Treaty would be applicable during wartime. Even if that was the expec-
tation of the drafters, a further unresolved issue is whether the treaty
would then be denounced and the Antarctic made the scene of warfare
and military operations.147 This again is a question whose answer would
depend upon whether the arena had become, in the perceptions of the
belligerents, a strategic area where the parties might introduce the scarce
resources of combat, or undertake from the area activities that would
most likely support, without waste, the war effort itself.148
147 See Shapley, Pax Antarctica, 40 BULL. ATOMIC Sci. 30, 30-32 (1984). Deborah Shapley,
observes that:
the Treaty has succeeded partly for political reasons-its terms admirably prevent any
party from losing anything it thinks important.. . individual nations see the Treaty as a
means to gain something-a voice in a future resource gold mine. . . . [L]uck has also
contributed to this success. Military technology has evolved so as to make the Antarctica
even less important strategically than in 1961 ...
. . . [Military planners in the late 1950's and early 1960's worried that the Soviet
Union might loop ICBM's the 'wrong' way round the Earth-over the South instead of the
North Pole-to evade north-pointing U.S. defenses. But the idea of this Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System faded, leaving Antarctica useless for missile tracking.
Id. Shapley concludes with a more telling argument that embraces the political relations of the
parties, implying that they have not for reasons of their own discovered strategic opportunities to
exploit:
The future success of the Treaty may depend less on the Treaty's uplifting language or on
what is said in Treaty group meetings or at the United Nations. So far, it has succeeded
because the political balance of the region has held-between East and West, claimant and
nonclaimant, large and small nations. In the difficult tests ahead, the parties to the Treaty
must follow wise national policies of their own to maintain this balance and to help ad-
vance this key arms control accord.
Id.
148 See Deane, Kass & Porth, The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation, 12 STRATE-
GIC REv. 55, 62 (1984). The authors quote N.V. Ogorkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet
Union, who argues that weapons technology leads to new strategic military measures that will deter-
mine future warfighting. He states:
A deep-indeed, fully revolutionary-change in military affairs is currently occurring in
connection with the development of thermonuclear weapons, the stormy evolution of elec-
tronics, the development of weapons based on new physical principles, as well as due to the
wide qualitative improvement of conventional weapons systems. This, in turn, impacts on
all other aspects of military affairs, primarily on the development and improvement of the
forms and methods of military operations and, consequently, on the organizational struc-
ture of troops and naval forces and on the improvement of armament systems and com-
mand and control organs. Realization of this dialectical process is particularly important
at the current state when on the basis of scientific-technological progress the main weapons
systems are being renewed practically every ten to twelve years. In these conditions, a
retarded reconstruction of views and stagnation in the elaboration and implementation of
new issues of military development are fraught with serious consequences.
Id. at 62.
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4. Claims to Regulate the Decisions
The demilitarization of Antarctica presupposes that the contracting
states have entered into their treaty in order to enable them to participate
in the most significant decision affecting their respective areas. Clearly
among such decisions are those relating to the preservation of the area as
a demilitarized area. This raises a question: whether, through the partic-
ipation of numerous states, the possibility of preserving demilitarization
is enhanced in view of the larger number of states affecting the decision
process, supporting the authority system, and establishing control over
the decisions that are made? In short, the question is that of the effec-
tiveness and enforceability of law itself. This issue is part of the larger
problem of establishing stabilized relations among states, applicable to all
arms control arenas that might be the subject of arms control initiatives,
and also applicable to all arenas involving (or potentially involving) the
use of force itself on a transnational basis.149
149 See Brzezinski, From Arms Control to Controlled Security, Wall. St. J., July 10, 1984, at 36,
col. 4. Arms control is a peacetime policy shared among states and its principal goal is to maintain
through such controls a balance in weapons capabilities and a weapons posture that will lead to
deterrence regarding use of such weapons in the initiation of hostilities, or in some perspectives,
regarding the use of such weapons during the escalation of hostilities. Policies based upon self-
defense differ, because states then traditionally perceive their goals in terms of the preferred out-
comes of hostilities. In arms control processes the security of the participating states is mutually
shared-the arms control policy is effective only because they can mutually share their objectives.
Zbigniew Brzezinski describes a differing but presumably shared policy in which the parties seek
"controlled security," and he suggests that the development of this balancing process and equilib-
rium arises where one of the sides-in the present case, the Soviet Union-has given up on arms
control policy and strategy. The Soviet Union has done so by insisting that the United States accept
a new balance with regard to the Pershing and related missiles in Europe. Brzezinski believes this
would lead to a change in the arms control balancing, and in short to Soviet weapon superiority
through launching or delivery superiority, and through weapons superiority per se. In this context,
there is a shift to new factors: to increased weapons modernization and the competition that arises
in modernization and the need to develop verification capabilities that are rapidly stretching beyond
our grasp. He states:
It will be increasingly difficult to impose effective and verifiable limits on these [new] weap-
ons. The verification problem is becoming increasingly acute, given the mobility of the new
systems and the opportunities for rapid reloading and covert deployment. The question of
how to control qualitative improvements plagued SALT II negotiators and, at best, only a
partially satisfactory response was developed. Their difficulties pale in comparison. Ade-
quate verification of both qualitative and quantitative limits would require access to storage
facilities and even perhaps to production centers. As a consequence, it is realistic to con-
clude that for both political and technological reasons, the chances of a truly comprehen-
sive agreement, which can be reliably verified, are rapidly fading.
Id.
Under these circumstances Brzezinski favors strategic defense systems such as those proposed
by the Reagan administration. Such a defense may not safeguard society, but "it can increasingly
complicate the planning and execution of an effective first strike." Id. In this sense it would restore
deterrence that is gradually being dissipated, and, in fact, is essential for that purpose. The counter-
part to this effort with weapons may exist with other arms control measures such as demilitarization,
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In part these claims to regulate decisions have found root in Soviet
proposals, purporting however to be arms control agreements. As with
attempts to control and limit acts of aggression through a systematic im-
position of authority150 there is a belief that some controls, presumably
effective and enforceable, might be achieved if rival states conclude and
ratify treaties and agreements that would make "aggression" appear in
the form of the use of force itself. In recent Soviet "arms control" pro-
posals for outer space, for example, the operative provisions would reach,
in part, to weapons-prohibiting their deployment or launching and use
in outer space-and in part to their use under any circumstances.1 51
Such proposals are ambiguous because they do not clarify what states
would be expected to reserve under their claims of "self defense," let
alone establish when "self defense," itself an ambiguous term, is to be
invoked. These proposals, when generalized along with similar proposals
that promise "no first use" of nuclear or mass destruction weapons, are
based upon an exchange of promises. Such promises are enforceable only
by the system of guarantees to respond by counter-threats, or by with-
drawing from the agreement.
Other arms control efforts that might be considered for Antarctica
seemingly lack substance as well.1 52  While demilitarization might be
under consideration for strengthening procedures, 153 several experiences
the subject of the present paper. Attention there must be centered on the effectiveness and the will of
the parties to guarantee the demilitarization status. The demilitarization process, a process beyond
the simple guarantees partly expressed and partly implied in the Antarctica Treaty, must then be
molded around a framework of operability: i.e., around the means to ensure that if actions are taken
contrary to the demilitarization established they can immediately be countered. A failure to main-
tain demilitarization in response to a challenge to establish strategic claims to Antarctica would be
tantamount to a larger challenge for superiority in the area of the continent itself.
150 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 39, 51.
151 See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347; The Moon
Treaty, supra note 7.
152 See generally Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753 (1982); Kaiser, Leber, Mertes & Schulze, Nuclear Weapons and the
Preservation of Peace: A German Response, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1157 (1982). But see THE APOCALYP-
TIC PROMISE 5, 23, 273, 401 (E. Lefer & E. Hunt eds. 1980). Proposals for a nuclear freeze have
similarities to demilitarization to the extent that the freeze affects the addition of armaments, their
deployment, or their modernization. The nuclear freeze is often combined with a no-first-use propo-
sal intended to reach the nuclear weapons. But here the issue turns on the deterrence equilibrium
itself, because deterrence is believed to be the outcome not only of the balancing of weapons, but of
the existence of weapons whose destruction is so intolerable that states possessing these weapons
have a genuine reason for refraining from using them, apart from the promises of guarantees made in
an agreement. No first use would deny the credibility of this threat and counterthreat balance, and
favor only the party that might first be willing to threaten, and then, if necessary, invoke such
weapons.
153 See generally A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT (T.
Dupuy ed. 1973); W. ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY, 1914-1941 (1971); USGPO, DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 436, 478, 728 (1978); Storr, The
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would appear to be uncertain and tenuous: 5 4 the Latin American Nu-
clear Freeze Zone Treaty, 5' the zones of peace, 156 neutrality'5 7 and se-
curity zones, 158 mutual and balanced force reductions, 159 and so on.
MBFR Process and its Prospects, 27 ORBIS 999 (1984); J. HEADLAM-MORLEY, STUDIES IN DIPLO-
MATIC HISTORY (1930). The most effective demilitarized zone currently in practice is the demilita-
rized border of the United States and Canada. The unique relationship between the two countries
and their common background supports the effectiveness of this arena.
154 See President Reagan'sAddress From Washington, Jan. 16, 1984, 22 ATLANTIC Q. 4 (1984);
General Secretary Chernenko's Address of April 9, 1984, 22 ATLANTIc Q. 10 (1984). The Soviet
Union tends to concentrate its policies on potential adversaries so that its global policy is
subordinated to "neutralizing" or perhaps eliminating its rivals, and maintaining its security against
each of them. President Reagan suggests a larger global policy aimed at reducing and eventually
eliminating the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing the stockpiles of
armaments and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.
155 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281. Additional Protocol
I, Feb. 14, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 362. Additional Protocol II, Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364. This treaty was designed to include, among the ratify-
ing states, those states that were sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere below the Rio Grande.
Two additional Protocols, to establish the full coverage against the introduction of nuclear weapons
in the area covered by the Treaty reach to states that are not territorial sovereigns. The Treaty, in
addition to the arms control limitations on the weapons and testing, also prohibits the use, so that if
applicable during wartime would purport to deny the use of the weapons in combat. Because the
United States believed that if other nuclear weapons states were drawn into combat in the treaty area
this would be tantamount to the introduction of nuclear weapons, the United States included an
understanding (reservations are not permitted under the treaty) that a Contracting Party assisted by
a nuclear weapons state would be acting inconsistent with that party's obligations. Difficulties arise
because the treaty area covers the high seas, and the United States refused to make them a nuclear
free zone. The United States also declared that the contracting states had not waived their exclusive
rights to grant or deny transit or transport privileges so that the issue of nuclear armed ships or
aircraft would be avoided.
156 See USGPO, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1732, 1843,
1846 (1979). The United States position on "zones of peace" is not unlike that of the position taken
with respect to nuclear-free zones or weapons-free zones. With respect to the Indian Ocean, for
example, the United States declared that primarily the Ocean must not to be the locus of an arms
race among rivals; that it was to be established consistent with the rights of self defense of nations
under the United Nations Charter, and consistent with the freedom of the seas. Moreover, the
United States would not agree to withholding nuclear weapons from its naval vessels, though the
United States had proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union to this end. The United States has
taken the position, however, that agreements entered into will be strictly construed against the obli-
gations, rather than the spirit of the agreements.
157 See Harrison, The US.S.R., Japan, and the End of the Great Pacific War, 14 PARAMETERS
(JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE) 76, 78-79 (1984). The Neutrality Treaty between
the Soviet Union and Japan was abrogated by the Soviet Union.
158 C. BLACK, R. FALK, K. KNORR & 0. YOUNG, NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS
147-48 (1968). Neutralization, as used by the authors, anticipates that an inhabited state will be the
subject of such action. However, the similarity of neutralization with demilitarization in the per-
spectives of these authors appears in the following:
The conclusion that we reach is as tentative as it is complex. The acceptability of neutrali-
zation depends on the comparative merits of diplomatic alternatives. The stability of neu-
tralization depends on the congruence of the objectives of the guarantor powers inter se
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Each of these cases depends on complex verification and compliance net-
works, 160 upon monitoring and inspection faithfully performed (perhaps
through international as well as state by state control systems), upon pro-
cedures and institutions fully applied for resolving differences and dis-
putes and, perhaps more importantly, for projecting and developing
more effective and controlling law itself. Analysis of these other meas-
ures is a subject in itself, but the limited practice among states with re-
spect to their application makes their adoption for strengthening
demilitarization in Antarctica a speculative matter.
5. Claims for Regulation Through Checks and Balancing
Minimum global order and global order processes, and the security
associated with these processes, are promoted through a checks and bal-
ancing process presently applicable to arms control, or to "balancing of
power" among nations that effectively (or seemingly) insures them
against uncontrollable uses of force. 161 Such minimum order processes
may be a strategy shared among states (and to this extent an inclusive
strategy), even if they are the outcome of their separate and individual
measures. 162 This outcome is dictated by the action-response nature of
and vis i vis the neutralized state itself. The maintenance of neutralization rests on a
combination of many factors, including the good faith of the guarantors, the capacity of the
neutralized state for autonomy, the will and capability of the guarantor powers to take
action if the terms of neutralization are brought into jeopardy, and the effectiveness of any
machinery set up to preserve neutralization.
Id.
The arrangements for the neutralization of Laos, and a proposed neutralization treaty are in-
cluded in this text, building upon the above conclusions. It is noteworthy in each of these and in the
above conclusion that neutralization depends ultimately upon the relations among the guarantor
states-often today rival states-maintaining through their own actions a checks and balancing ac-
tion, either separately or jointly, to ensure that neutralization is maintained, and that neutralization
like demilitarization is most likely to break down once the area covered becomes strategically impor-
tant (in war or peacetime).
159 See West Presents Major Proposal on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 32
NATO REV. 32 (1984); George, The New MBFR Treaty Proposak An American Perspective, 30
NATO REv. 31 (1982); Torentta, The Nuclear Strategy of the Atlantic Alliance and the "No-First-
Use" Debate, 30 NATO REv. 1-3 (1982).
160 The proposals that are antecedent in recent years to the mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions, include the so-called "Rapacki Plan," named after the Polish Foreign Minister who intro-
duced it. 2 DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT:1945-1959, doc. 315 (1960). The
Soviet Union first proposed disengagement of forces, force reductions and possible consideration of
inspection through Eisenhower's open-skies proposal on November 17, 1956. 1 DEP'T OF STATE
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT: 1945-1959, doc. 183, at 726-29 (1960). The Rapacki Plan was
announced on November 4, 1958, proposing an atom-free zone in Central Europe.
161 See generally 2 J. BUTLER, GRAND STRATEGY: SEPT. 1939 - JUNE 1941, at 567 (1957); M.
BOTHE, K. PARTSCH & W. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1982); RE-
STRAINTS ON WAR (M. Howard ed. 1979).
162 Order promoting activities, actions and decisions among states are of great significance,
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states engaged in variants of an arms competition,'63 and in fact is estab-
lished through the natural or inherent rivalry among major states com-
peting for scarce resources (or, when treated as a scarce resource,
competing for power itself).
The checks and balancing process provides order between rival
states opposing each other, largely in confrontational modes. These
states are sharing, at a minimum, a "rational framework" within which
they can calculate the risks of aggression or the use of force, and in which
they share the sense that both sides believe that they have reasonably
similar risk perceptions.' The process may involve at least minimal
communications to avoid deception, surprise or subterfuge. Deception is
avoided with respect to the weapons covered in their agreements, their
arms control arrangements, and with respect to the rules of the game for
using force.
The checks and balancing process proceeds through a changing pos-
ture of threat and counter-threat, not unlike that found generally in the
relations among hostile states, but it is more closely oriented with regard
to the arms control component to the elements that make up that compo-
nent. While they may not fully share an understanding relating to deter-
rence and the maintenance of a deterrence equilibrium, the effectiveness
of their checks and balancing process depends on reaching a deterrence
outcome, regardless of what it is called (or whether it even has a
name).165 However, the strategic balancing is part of a dynamic process,
and hence the arms control component tends to become enlarged, ex-
even if under circumstances where competitive processes prevail. Such order is maintained only at
the minimum levels through the checks and balancing of weapons.
Lasswell and Kaplan observe that "the balancing is the power process among the participants in
an arena." Moreover, the arena is "military" when "the expectation of violence is high." H. LAsS-
WELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 250-52 (1950).
163 See V. LENIN, SELECTED WORKS, VOL. X, at 112, 137, 139 (1943). The doctrine of "divide
and conquer" was adopted as an appropriate strategy by Lenin in attacking, at the lowest cost, his
capitalist enemies.
164 See Hamburg & George, Nuclear Crisis Management, 40 BULL. ATOMIC Sc. 24-28 (1984);
Nunn-Warner Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Risk Reduction Center, 40 BULL.
ATOMIC SI. 28 (1984); see also AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD
283, 294, 302. (R. Stebbins & E. Adam eds. 1976).
165 Confidence building measures have appeared in the bilateral context of SALT II, and in the
multilateral context of the Helsinki Accords. In the bilateral sense, the measures are used to pro-
mote compliance with the arms control agreements. Lewis and Lorell declare the "potential role"
with respect to the multilateral expectations of the 35 nation Conference on Disarmament in Europe
(Stockholm, January, 1984) "to help defense nascent crises, to reduce the escalatory risks inherent in
crisis situations, and to lessen international tensions in general." Lewis & Lorell, Confidence-Build-
ing Measures and Crisis Resolution: Historical Perspectives, 28 ORaBs 281 (1984). The authors men-
tion the use of such measures during wartime - "for example, avoidance of direct attacks on
national command-and control facilities," and attributed restraint on all sides not to use lethal gases
during World War II to such measures. Id. at 287.
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tending to a quest for balancing the impact of alliances and strategic ba-
ses of power.
These same assumptions and perspectives apply to demilitarized ar-
eas such as Antarctica because they can be translated into principles of
stabilization applicable to the making of determinations about the rela-
tions of the rivals,' 66 and because demilitarized areas, while they are not
readily perceived in terms of deterrence, are readily established in terms
of their strategic importance. Antarctica is thus a continent where, be-
cause the competitive elements among states so far have been minimal (in
part through the Antarctic regime, and in part through the natural obsta-
cles to exploitation), the strategic element is dormant.
Comparison with other demilitarized areas illuminates the unique-
ness of each of these, so that analogies among demilitarized areas are
very limited. Each develops its strategic elements in accordance with
circumstances that vary as to each. Svalbard (Spitzbergen) is a naturally
strategic arena because it commands the Barents Sea and the Kola Penin-
sula, as well as the Arctic itself. Its significance to the United States and
the Soviet Union needs no emphasis here. Areas such as the Rhineland
could be demilitarized and maintained as such only as long as guarantor
states in the vicinity were able, through force if necessary, to maintain
the demilitarized status. The high seas have only just begun to offer the
possibility of resource development, but states with differing perspectives
on exploiting, mining, and drawing down on the resources in the seabeds
were unable to agree upon a regulatory system that would satisfy their
economic goals and policies. The strategic nature of this arena remains
in question, but will be revealed once competition for the resources be-
gins in earnest.
Outer space16 7 is an area now proposed for demilitarization. 168
166 See H. KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 11 (1969); see generally L. JAFFE, JUDI-
CIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 8 (1933). Checks and balances are the appropriate balanc-
ing process to preserve and promote order where there are differing, competing and usually opposing
power entities or power blocs. The experience of the United States shows that this process, if regu-
lated so that the process itself is maintained and not upset, is the effective means to enforce stability.
It presupposes as with competition in general that some "regulatory" mechanism is operative. The
rivals are not expected to seek to destabilize the system for their own strategic or competitive advan-
tage, or to take over the system and replace it with their own. The same perspective appears in THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). Madison declares:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might
be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it
particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim
is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other. . the private interests of each individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the
supreme powers of the state.
167 See generally C. GRAY, AMERICAN MILITARY SPACE POLICY (1982); T. SCHELLING & M.
HALPERIN, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL (1961).
168 Aguew argues that the Soviet antisatellite weapon is so crude that it cannot operate effec-
tively for anti-satellite purposes. Yet at the same time he "perceives" that the Soviet weapon can
Vol. 17:229
DEMILITARIZATION
However, its strategic significance flows from a variety of factors: re-
sources are available for exploitation; transit and transportation are prob-
able uses, (demanding, however, claims to launching and orbiting arenas
that necessarily foreclose others from simultaneous use); communica-
tions, reconnaissance, earth sensing, broadcasting and television
networking, weather and navigation support activities, and so on. These
require exclusive orbits in areas that must be limited or they cannot be
performed effectively (again foreclosing others once they have been occu-
pied). The establishing of space stations and platforms, manned or un-
manned, and the limited number of LaGrange locations (a maximum of
five), where stations are equally pulled by gravity so that they can be
permanently located, means that only a few states can enjoy their
benefits.
Accordingly, while Antarctica forms a working "model" to consider
the proposals for outer space, upon analysis it is evident that the unique-
ness of the arenas makes them less comparable than might at first be
supposed. Outer space, unlike Antarctica, offers proximity or adjacency
that has strategic importance for military activities. Outer space is so
readily exploited that commercial or private enterprisory activities can be
easily shifted to military activities and purposes. The technologies asso-
ciated with such activities are readily applied to military uses, particu-
larly with respect to access, maneuvers, launching techniques, repairs
and the like. These all can lead to ease of interference, or ease of frustra-
tion of the missions of rival space craft and satellites. The anti-satellite
implications of peaceful activities are inherent in those activities, and the
only restraint upon whether use for military or peaceful purposes is
either self-imposed or is in response to an exchange of agreements not to
interfere. The extraordinary potential for command, control, communi-
cations and intelligence through space satellites, along with the requisi-
tion of peaceful space objects for these purposes, is beyond the
expectations of effective enforcement by an agreement built around
promises.
reach and destroy a United States shuttle. Agnew would have us examine Soviet intentions with a
view toward reaching an arms control agreement applicable to such weapons before the technologies
are unleashed. Yet in the same article he points out that the existing ICBM weaponry and technol-
ogy would, with little or no more research and testing, produce substantial antisatellite capabilities.
Agnew, ASAT- What are the Russians Really Up To?, The Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1984, at A15,
col. 5.
For texts relating to breakdown in communications and their association with outbreak of war
see, R. HOUGH, THE GREAT WAR AT SEA (1914-1918) (1983); . HEADLAM-MORLEY, STUDIES IN
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (1930); J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SO-
VIET TREATIES (1962); THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (H. Baade, ed. 1965).
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6. Miscellaneous Claims
Other claims are involved with respect to Antarctica. These overlap
those already mentioned, and again are analyzed in terms of inclusive
and exclusive strategies and goals. These claims, in large measure, are
the claims of states other than the major rivals, i.e., other than those of
the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, so far the claims are
of individual states, not of blocs of states, as with the Moon Treaty). 169
Such claims advanced by blocs of states with common interests or by
alliances can be expected when the interested parties seek greater partici-
pation through the power of mutual support and claim.
But, as discussed previously, we can anticipate a wide range of spe-
cific claims regarding perspectives," 0 including: those just mentioned
with regard to the preferred public order systems; claims regarding situa-
tions (those identified with how matters, decisions and policies shall be
pursued, imposed or enforced, or differences resolved); claims regarding
bases of power in the area (including those that may be possessory at
first, and then raised to territorial claims, and ultimately leading to com-
petitive situations that might jeopardize the demilitarization of the conti-
nent); and claims regarding modalities or the procedures or institutions
for resolving claims. The interaction of these claims and claims
processes with states' strategies and policies promotes the competitive
processes. At the same time, states seek to exploit the outcomes that
might come from participating in those processes.
IV. PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF ANTARCTICA
The conditions for stabilization in Antarctica are primarily associ-
ated with relations and actions among states. Most particularly associ-
ated with stabilization are the claims processes shared among them,
which are designed to maintain demilitarization, and to control actions
and decisions that might lead to the continent becoming a strategic
arena. These conditions for stabilization can be attained if resource de-
velopment is itself constrained. If resource development is permitted to
occur, stabilization can only be achieved through participation of the
contracting states to avoid tensions and conflicts over the resource
claims. It is evident that these conditions require deliberate action: the
possibilities and pressures for possessory claims, associated with resource
development; and for territorial claims, associated in general with na-
tional prestige, are fairly great. Stabilizing conditions would also ac-
count for pollution and ecological control and protection, for denying
and preventing military activities of any kind on the continent, and for
169 The Moon Treaty, supra note 7.
170 See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
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increased efforts at scientific exchange and cooperation. All activities
among states include competitive elements. Cooperation among them is
at best an activity in which competition is either regulated, or is an activ-
ity that can be readily shared; such as the postal services, telephonic
communications, and so on.
Unlike outer space Antarctica offers less in the form of strategic fac-
tors that are associated with military postures and strategy. The advent
of weapons that are delivered through ballistic and cruise missiles, the
growing technologies related to submarines and other submersibles, and
the possibilities in outer space itself, limit the attraction of Antarctica,
and reduce the willingness of states to allocate scarce resources, for stra-
tegic or other purposes, at the present time, to the continent. They may,
at best, find measures that can provide limited uses: means for hardening
the snowbound surfaces for transport or aircraft, means for exploiting
the surrounding seas or continental shelves, or for working beneath the
surface.
Projections into the future suggest that the Antarctic regime may
continue without substantial change for a brief period into the immediate
future. But the future remains murky primarily because the relations
among rivals are unclear. With support from increased showing of re-
straint among the rivals and of greater attention to a public order for
their relations in general, in addition to a gradual reduction of their
weaponry and their recourse to the use of military measures, we could
anticipate an Antarctica that will remain non-strategic and a part of the
"global commons." In the section relating to specific claims among the
participants, it was noted that the traditional claims processes among
states determine the future of the public order that they may be choosing
to establish.
Unfortunately, states in their relations today have assumed con-
frontational postures and have thrust at each other entirely different
global perspectives. Because these perspectives are fundamentally differ-
ent, ensuring a public order in Antarctica that fulfills the needs for opti-
mizing human dignity will require a shift in the design and use of our
policy instruments. This shift must be more emphatically aimed toward
taking from the Soviet social order processes all those elements that are
congenial to our own. The shift must be toward supporting those fea-
tures in the Soviet Constitution and law and policy, even if more rudi-
mentary with regard to human rights than ours, that might be more
promising for these goals. While such a shift does not contemplate re-
fraining in any way from the measures required for our own defense, it
does entail a careful, yet cautious, development of strategic instruments
of policy that will encourage needed change and accommodation in So-
viet policy. Such a policy for the United States is both supportive of
stabilization in our relations with our major rival in Antarctica and else-
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where, and of positive measures that will reduce the strategic competi-
tion in areas such as Antarctica.
V. THE COMMON INTEREST IN STABILIZED RELATIONS
1. The Claims Process and Establishment of Public Order
All states have an interest in promoting public order, because
through that order, they are able to promote their own security with an
economy of effort, to ensure the legitimacy and support of their actions
and decisions, and to provide for the preservation and promotion of the
values they prize. As long as they meet with opposition from other
states, they act through a variety of strategies in claims processes: they
impose their claims and demands upon each other, some of which they
tolerate, while others they oppose, sometimes with military force. As
this claims process proceeds, a convergence of interests develops and ten-
dencies appear that are inclusive in nature, laying the groundwork for a
common interest. Under present circumstances, the primary common
interest dictated by the rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union
is in avoiding the intolerable destruction of the major nuclear weapons,
and because both sides maintain such weapons, both maintain a mutual
interest in deterring or preventing any war that might lead to the use of
the major weapons.
This broad policy based process is also the process associated with
the development of customary international law. The convergence of in-
terests, and the development of mutual or reciprocal tolerances are asso-
ciated with the development of such law. While the process is necessarily
slow (particularly because the major political entities have deeply op-
posed value systems and are heavily armed by a rapidly advancing tech-
nology), convergence itself is recognizable, and the process can be
assessed as order-promoting. Law supports the development of public
order, and is reciprocally supported by it so that the decisions and ac-
tions identified with the claims among states take on a constitutive
importance.
The claims process among states reflects the realities of their behav-
ior. As the process proceeds, tendencies toward a convergence of inter-
ests appear. As the separate, exclusive strategies, and the sanctioning
instruments that all states employ, the ideological, diplomatic, economic
and military policy instruments, are opposed by each other, outcomes
result that suggest reciprocal tolerances with regard to what is permitted
and what is not permitted.
In the assessment of the realities of state behavior- realities that
make arms control and disarmament efforts effective and realities that
make demilitarization an effective measure of the contribution of arms
control to the stability among states-it is necessary to look to the way in
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which states are making claims and demands upon each other, what they
are demanding from each other, and the measures they are taking to
ensure that those demands are satisfied. It is necessary, as well, to look
to the credibility and perceptions of others concerning their decisions,
the expression and implementation of their will to act, and their perspec-
tives relating to the use of force.
171
Through the claims processes states will ultimately establish their
security, because those processes include the entire range of communica-
tions and relations in which they go about building security, including
resorting to the use of force. Through such processes, states establish
public order, though they might deliberately choose to challenge each
other over the public order that they are demanding and are willing to
fight for, and over the means that they might use to achieve public order
goals. 172 In pursuing their claims they are projecting and relying upon
power and influence, because these are critical among the instruments
available among states for both security and order-oriented purposes. 173
171 As long as demilitarization remains effective it will serve the general arms control goals. If
it falls apart then, of course, there is a potential for the increased costs of exploiting the areas such as
Antarctica for their full strategic possibilities. The Congressional Budget Office of the Congress of
the United States has determined that arms control agreements must not be inconsistent with the
goals of security of the nation, that these goals are dependent upon military capabilities and the
modernization and introduction of new weaponry (because the process cannot be controlled between
the rivals), and hence the agreements are primarily useful as a means of saving money in the overall
business of ensuring self-defense. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINIS-
TRATION STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AND MODERNIZATION PROPOSALS (1984). The further
goal of arms control aimed at the peaceful settlement of disputes is not mentioned in the report:
The analysis in this chapter suggests that it will be difficult- in the absence of arms con-
trol-to save substantial amounts of money, especially in the near term, without harming
the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces. The Congress has already re-
viewed and approved major modernization programs in every part of the strategic triad,
and it is not likely to alter them without an arms control agreement. Perhaps even more
than in the past, therefore, arms control offers the most reasonable hope of achieving sub-
stantial cost savings.
Id. at 57-58.
172 See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1961); Howard, The Causes of War, 8 WILSON Q. 90, 99-100; see also J. HEADLAM-MORLEY, supra
note 168, at 254 (1984); W. KUEHL, SEEKING WORLD ORDER (THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO 1920) (1969). The promotion of global order entails the legal regula-
tion and control over the use of force because it is unrealistic to insist that states will abandon their
claims to use force when they believe that such uses are legal or permissible, including those uses in
self-defense. This perspective compels us to accept weapons in a checks and balancing process in-
tended and expected to deter the uses of force and to shift state policies toward a shared global order.
But fundamental assumptions are involved here, i.e., that states will give up those competitive pres-
sures and demands that are so great and that they will use force with respect to promoting or defend-
ing the "interests" they entail: "Arms races may. . . be the result of a quite deliberate assertion of
an intention to change the status quo, as was, for example the German naval challenge to Britain at
the beginning of this century." Howard, supra, at 100.
173 Pipes, How to Cope with the Soviet Threat, 78 COMMENTARY 13 (1984).
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And through the public order they seek to establish, states are always
insisting that their actions, decisions and policies are legitimate, while
those of their opponents are not. 174
As this inquiry indicates, the process may lead to an "equilibrium"
in which by the checking and balancing of the aggression or perceived
aggression, the rivals attempt to prevent serious destruction of the values
they wish to protect. Or, such inquiry may proceed through a concerted
or at least reasonably shared effort to establish the institutions and
processes that can serve common interests and goals. With respect to
both of these orientations, the measuring standard relates to the common
interest in stability, and to relations sufficiently stabilized so the risks of
violence or hostilities breaking out will be minimized. Where the major
rivals are engaged in serious confrontations, their primary interest is first
and foremost in minimum public order and minimum stability commen-
surate with maintaining that order.
Demilitarized arenas are arenas in which the states guaranteeing de-
militarized status have either determined that the arena will remain free
of hostile combat because it is not a strategic arena, or because they be-
lieve that even if it is strategic in nature, they can check each other from
174 That the calculation among states with regard to their actions, particularly their adoption
of military measures, must now take account of nuclear weapons and the perceived probability that
the use of such weapons may lead to "suicide" is noted by Howard, supra note 172:
When the decision to go to war involves the likelihood, if not the certainty, that the conflict
will take the form of an exchange of nuclear weapons from which one's own territory
cannot be immune, then even for the most bellicist of leaders, even for those most insulated
from the pressures of public opinion, the calculation that they have more to gain from
going to war than by remaining at peace and pursuing their policies by other means will, to
put it mildly, not be self-evident. The odds against such a course benefiting their state or
themselves or their cause will be greater, and more evidently greater, than in any situation
that history has ever had to record. Society may have accepted killing as legitimate instru-
ment of state policy, but not, as yet, suicide. For that reason I find it hard to believe that
the abolition of nuclear weapons, even if it were possible, would be an unmixed blessing.
Nothing that makes it easier for statesmen to regard war as a feasible instrument of state
policy, one from which they stand to gain rather than lose is likely to contribute to a lasting
peace.
Id. at 103.
Clearly Howard is making assumptions of his own, and equally clearly he is overlooking the
tendency among strategists to seek continuously those games where the "rules" might enable them to
move more freely, and where those rules may include military measures. In overlooking these ele-
ments and factors, Howard does not here (and does not intend to) examine the situations in which
states, designing and applying their strategies, are in search of more effective means to promote or
defend the policies of their governments. See generally Dyson, The Game of Guerrilla, 150 YALE
LiT. MAG. 71 (1984). Dyson's thesis is that under the nuclear stalemate and perhaps aided and
abetted by it, the United States has accepted a "game" designed by the Soviet Union, and controlled
by it, aimed at reaching Soviet objectives either through situations that can be exploited directly or
indirectly by such forces or by the Soviet Union, or, as in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, through
direct action by the Soviet Union, where the United States has been tested and found wanting.
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utilizing it for strategic advantage. 75 The claims process with respect to
demilitarization is one that relates to either of these two perspectives.
Such a process presupposes for Antarctica that claims for strategic pref-
erences, in resources or in establishing presence for example, will be
checked or balanced among the claimants. It also presupposes that
claims for participation in the making of decisions and the development
of policies relating to the continent will either be shared to the advantage
of each, or, if a few seek control, then only those maintaining control will
have controlling decisions, and the other participants will be effectively
vetoed.
But demilitarized arenas are arenas in which states have no reason
to compete. Once they perceive that their interests are engaged, that
competition within the arena is rising, and that their exclusive claims for
security or public order are involved, it is likely that the will to maintain
the arena as a demilitarized arena will erode. Once states perceive the
need to engage in the arena for their own self-defense, or for establishing
a critical base of power, the demilitarized status cannot last.
These are the perceptions, even if limited in their effectiveness, of
demilitarization for Antarctica. However, they compel us, as do arms
control measures, and the perspectives on strategy, deterrence, and the
repeated efforts to regulate the use of force, to recognize that the will of
states to pursue public order suffused by a common interest is the crucial
factor in making demilitarization in particular, or arms control in gen-
eral, effective. Little can be said about whether the adoption of arms
control measures or demilitarization will improve stability in the rela-
tions among states, or will lead to better relations among them. The
practice among states so far indicates that they can, and are willing, to
pursue such policies and the agreements projecting such policies,
notwithstanding the realization that they are competitors for power and
influence, and competing in such a way that none of their efforts and
negotiations can be reasonably identified as leading to common interests
beyond that of avoiding nuclear war. Yet the claims process is a process
of converging interests, and if the goals that are sought in arms control
are not reduced to the pettiness of weaponry that has relatively little mili-
tary utility and to demilitarization efforts in which the actions of states
are primarily non-aggressive, then there are opportunities to be exploited
that might lead to a shared public order, and a common interest both in
sharing it and in achieving it.'76
175 C. VON CLAUSEWrrZ, supra note 34, at 90-91, 97, 177.
176 With demilitarization, or with arms control in general, the issue is moving from "offsetting
deterrent capabilities" to a moderated form of deterrence employing defense and meeting traditional
expectations. This was expressed by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze on March 28, 1985, in the Alastair
Buchan Memorial Lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London:
[A]rms control should be viewed as one element of our security policy. It compliments the
1985]
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measures that we must take unilaterally, such as maintaining weapons and forces necessary
for an adequate deterrent. Arms control is not a substitute or replacement for adequate
defenses. Indeed, experience indicates that, while arms control hopefully can play an im-
portant role in enhancing our security. . . what we are able and willing to do for ourselves
is more important. . . . Whether or not we have arms control agreements, it is necessary
[to] have sufficient military forces, both conventional and nuclear, to deter an armed attack
by the Soviet Union and its associates.
